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CHAPTER I
FORMAL DEFINITION OF
PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to present the formal
limits and extent of philosophy of psychology. This is
done by formal definition, and by comparison with two simi-
lar disciplines. These two are: philosophical psychology
and scientific psychology. Tie comparisons are concrete
in the sense that they deal with current psychological
thinking as it exists, rather than with normative defini-
tions of the two disciplines. This method serves a sec-
ondary purpose of making the definition of the limits and
extent of philosophy of psychology contemporary.
The first division of the chapter discusses philosophy
of psychology as a formal discipline. The second division
compares philosophy of psychology thus discussed with philo-
sophical psychology. The third division does the same
against the background of current (i.e., during the past ten
or fifteen years) scientific psychological thinking. The
final division is a summary of conclusions as to the formal
limits and extent of philosophy of psychology.
1. PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
The interpretation of psychological data and theory
according to a philosophical principle derived from psycho-
logical data and theory constitutes philosophy of psychology.

2A philosophical principle relates empirical data and
theory, in this case the psychological, to that which is
held to he ultimate and irreducible. Ultimate means that
the principle cannot he included within the scope of any
other principle. Irreducible means that the principle is the
final word for those who accept it.
Psychological data are observable components into which
human behavior and conduct can be analyzed or synthesized.
Psychological data must have some perceptual or introspective
existence
•
Psychological theory states a demonstrated relationship
among psychological data. Psychological theory may be phe-
nomenal, as in the case of the conditioned-response theory.
Here many relevant data are subsumed under a single scientific
principle. Or, psychological theory may be conceptual, as,
for example, the theory of the unconscious and explanatory
categories. Conceptual theory subsumes many relevant data
under a mental construct that has no perceptual or intro-
spective existence.
1
Interpretation is making the data and theories meaning-
ful in terms of the philosophical principle.
The benefits to psychology and philosophy accruing
from philosophy of psychology are clearly stated by William
1. Cf . Moore and Gurnee, PP, 121, from which the dis-
tinction between phenomenal and conceptual theory was adapted.

3Stern, who writes that the problems of philosophy
greifen vielmehr von alien Seiten hinein
in das Gewebe psychologis cher Erfahrungs-
wissenschaf t, bringen in deren Befunde
Ordnung und System, Sinn und Deutung.
Andrerseits erffihrt die philosophische
Psychologie von der forts chreitenden
Spezialforschung her eine Begrenzung,
Konkretisierung und Kontrolle, die vor
den fruheren Abwegigkeiten einer bloss
spekulativen wirklichkeitsfernen
Psychologie schutzt.2
It is the task of philosophy of psychology to make these
implicit issues explicit, and mutually coherent with its
empirically derived philosophical principle.
2. THE RELATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
TO PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Although philosophy of psychology is essentially
different from philosophical psychology, the two bear more
than a superficial resemblance. The difference and resem-
blance will be pointed out after a brief exposition of the
nature of philosophical psychology.
i. Philosophical Psychology . The nature of philo-
sophical psychology is determined by its consistency with
an accepted system of philosophy. Thus, Roman Catholic
2. AP, 13. This is a protest against the idea that
psychology is better off not to have "anything to do with
philosophy. By "philosophische Psychologie" Stern does
not mean philosophical psychology of the Thomistic type,
as the context makes obvious. He uses the expression to
refer to mutual interpenetration of psychology and phi-
losophy. For Howard D. Spoerl's translation, see Stern,
GP, 9.

4psychologists admit nothing into their psychology which is
not consistent with neo-Thomistic philosophy. Psychology is
a discipline which confirms a philosophical point of view;
it aims
by a judiciously combined use of reason-
ing and observation to attain to a well
grounded assurance regarding the exist-
ence of an immortal soul, its relations
to the body, its origin, and its future
destiny.
3
Thus, as Moore and Gurnee point out in their definition of
rational psychology, rational psychological truths are
derived by deduction from the general concept of what the
soul itself is. 4 With this presupposition as a premise for
deduction, philosophical psychology seeks to explain psycho-
logical phenomena by their metaphysical causes. The mind
itself, and not merely analysis, classification and gener-
alization, is proper to psychology. "Whether it wishes it
or not, Psychology is inevitably a branch of Philosophy. "5
ii. Comparison . The two disciplines under consideration
agree that psychology should be philosophically treated.
When purposes of the self and the mind-body problem, for
example, are under consideration metaphysical canons are
invoked for explanation. Thus, on the one hand the denial
of conscious purpose rests on the metaphysical postulates
3. Maher, PSY, 6. Italics mine.
4. FP, 4. Philosophical psychology is also called
metaphysical psychology.
5. Maher, PSY, 3.^

5of the mechanistic, deterministic view of the world engen-
dered by Newtonian physics, 6 On the other hand, the idea of
the self as a conscious functioner,^ or as a function of the
organism, 8 depend upon a metaphysical mind-body distinction
for their cogency.
But, whereas both recognize the propriety of philo-
sophical treatment of psychological data, there is an essen-
tial difference between the philosophy of psychology and
philosophical psychology. The former interprets psycholog-
ical data and theory according to a philosophical principle
which is inductively derived. Contrasted to this, the lat-
ter uses psychological data to confirm and give assurance
to an independently established point of view. In the first
case, psychology is a source of philosophy: in the second
case, psychology is a branch of philosophy. For philosophy
of psychology, philosophy is in a constant adjustment to the
demands of fact. For philosophical psychology, psychology
is amenable to the demands of philosophy. The one reasons
a posteriori : the other, a priori .
3. PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND CURRENT
SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
In 1892 the American Psychological Association was
founded. This date may conveniently mark the coming into
6. Cf. Winter, Art. (1936), 144: Bretscher, Art. (1931),
14-26; Lehman and V/ittey, Art. (1931), 669.
7. Cf. Calkins, FBP, 277.
8. Cf. Gordon, PER, 23, 28.

6self-consciousness in an organized way of American experi-
mental, scientific psychology. The "new" psychology of
James, Dewey, Angell, Hall, Cattell, Thorndike and Titchener
achieved solidarity by a common reaction against psychology
as a theory of consciousness, implying as this did, certain
metaphysical positions.
9
But, the solidarity of psychology was negative. When
it came to defining what psychology is, there were differ-
ences of opinion. However, during the past fifteen years or
so psychology has been trying to discover what its different
viewpoints have in common. It is preoccupied with "analysis
of basic presuppositions, discussion of foundation problems,
formulation of the logical principles inherent in theoretical
construction. "1° Psychology is busily staking out its claims
to autonomy as a science.
This effort is indicated by the current interest in
categories of psychological explanation, and by the interest
in the unifying of psychology, making of it a single science,
rather than segments of science. A brief exposition illus-
trating each of these current interests follows.
i. Some Current Psychological Categories . Gordon Allport
protests against the method of "analysis, abstraction and
generalization used in physical science, which psychology,
9. Cf . Woodworth, CSP, llf . Eut all psychological
theory has implicit in it philosophical presuppositions. See
below, page 19ff
.
10. Koch, A:rt.(1941), 15. Cf. Eergman and Spence, Art.
(1941), 1.

7"paddling in its wake," sought to imitate. This method
assumes a mechanistic conception of mental life in which there
is a "complete and unbroken continuity in the cause and
effect chain leading to a given response. "^^ This mecha-
nistic realm of discourse is the presupposition both of
structuralism and of the stimulus-response functional psy-
chology and Its modifications and derivations.^ Gestalt
psychology, also, in spite of its protest against elemental-
ism, makes the personality-Gestalt determined by organism and
environment. Similarly, organismic psychology regards the
organism as coming to terms with the environment without the
help of conscious purpose. 14
Against limiting psychological explanation to mechanis-
tic and deterministic canons there is a revolt. Allport
points out that a concern with abstract mind-in-general has
been the price of imitating the narrow canons of physical
science. Psychological explanation must be broadened by the
recognition that the data of general psychology are abstrac-
tions which become concrete only as they are related to the
whole of personality, including its self-directional expe-
rience .15
The positions of Mary Whiton Calkins and William Stern,
similar to Allport *s, were long maintained against the
11. PPI, 19, 23.
12. Bills, Art. (1939), 3^9; cf. 386.
13. Cf., for example, Titchener, TBP, 6; Carr, PSY, 80*
Tolman, PBAM, 3, 12: Watson, PSB, lOff
.
14. Cf., for example, Kfthler, GP, 370f; Goldstein, ORG,
371, 424: HNLP, 167.
15. PPI, 19-23? 190ff.

8mechanistic and deterministic presuppositions which underlie
much psychology. Miss Calkins points out that the failure to
refer the functions of an organism to a functioning self is
artifical. Biological usefulness is a necessary cano^ of
explanation, but without personal relations of the self, it
is meaningless William Stern points to the fictional
nature of psychological generalization:
Verallgemeingerungen sind deshalb im Bereich
der Psychologie nur durchfuhrbar vermittels
der Fiktion, dass man bestimmte Erscheinungen
herausgenomnen denkt aus der TotalitSt ihrer
ZusammenhSnge und deren alleinige Beziehung
zu bestimmten anderen Gliedern beachtet.
Psychological laws M sind nich unbedingt gultig, sondern nur
plausibelj sie haben hBhere oder geringere Y.'ahrscheinlich-
keit."17
David Baliin Klein includes the category of purpose
among his four ways of scientific understanding in psychology.
Causal explanation in terms of structural continuity and
function, and logical consistency are not sufficient for
scientific understanding. There must also be an empathic
type of understanding -- understanding in terms of human
motives
.
In other words, psychology involves all
four categories, while the natural sciences
involve but three. To be science, psy-
chology must become more anthropomorphic,
not less so, paradoxical and tautological
as this may sound. 18
16. FBP, 274-276
.
17. AP, 24; GP, 16.
18. Art. (1932), 567.

The category of purpose is also involved in Harry K. Johnson'
inclusion of explanation in terms of consequences, ss well as
concurrent and past events, among the explanatory concepts of
psychology. In a similar vein, Edwin R. Guthrie includes
the category of purpose in psychological explanation in the
interests of anticipating chanse.20
Not all those who see the inadequacy of a strictly
mechanistic conception of science are willing to expand the
limits of psychology, Arthur G. Eills holds that only on a
mechanistic basis is scientific psychology possible, for sci-
ence requires abstract and quantitative generalizations.
Study of the concrete, particular individual is not science;
it is "an art ... to be judged by standards of practical
effectiveness ."21
In contrast to the either-or position of Bills is the
both-and position of Donald Snygg. Snygg suggests the need
for two frames of reference: one objective, which observes
psychological data from the outside; and one phenomenological
which observes psychological data from the point of view of
the behaving organism. Thus , in describing learning objec-
tively, we speak of "trial and error;" in describing it
phenomenologically we speak of "insight."^
19. Art. (1939), 510f.
20. Art. (1933), 137.
21. Art. (1938), 324.
22. Art. (1941), 407.

For Theodore A. Bretscher the concrete wholeness of the
individual is not tenable as a scientific concept. Only
analysis into relationships of a mechanical scheme satisfies
the demand of human understanding. But Bretscher recognizes
that the concept of wholeness alone does justice to the indi-
vidual as he is, whereas mechanistic analysis distorts the
picture of actual mental life. This is the paradox of psy-
chological theorizing. 23
There is another encroachment upon the realm of deter-
ministic and mechanistic discourse. The theories of relativ-
ity and of the quantum have made the mechanistic presupposi-
tion of Newtonian physics obsolete. Physics now recognizes
the principle of indeterminancy.
Psychologists have not let this change go by unrecog-
nized. John E. Winter, pointing on the one hand to psychol-
ogists who are seeking to interpret their science in a deter-
ministic manner, and on the other hand to physicists who are
rejecting determinism in favor of indeterminism, makes this
observation: "Thus each, the psychologist and the physicist,
traverses in the progress of his thought the path the other
has left behind." 24 Winter suggests that mental energy, which
is not more mysterious than physical, be called "menton."
Then the body could be regarded as the medium for discharging
"menton" in its mental functioning. 25
23. Art. (1931), 14-26.
24. Art. (1936), 144. Cf. Lehman and Wittey, Art. (1931),
669.
25. Art. (1936), 147.
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But the revolution against the mechanistic, determinis-
tic limitations of psychology remains a revolution. Still
orthodox is the statement of Glenn D. Eigginson:
If we will assume that psychology is con-
cerned with brain function, not mind
function, we can speak a common language
with other sciences. We can readily accept
the categories of physics, chemistry,
neurology and physiology as explanatory
agencies
However, an influential section of psychological thought,
finding the escape from philosophy to natural science merely
an exchange of masters, is actively seeking to establish
non-mechanical and self-deterministic categories which will
overthrow the bondage to the postulates of Newtonian natural
science
•
ii. Systematization of Psychology . Another expression
of the theoretical interest of psychologists is seen in
efforts to systematize their science.
The appearance of symposia referring to psychology in
the plura 127 illustrates the divided condition of that
science. A decade ago Edna Heidbreder reported that "there
is not enough fact in the whole science of psychology to
make a single solid system," and hence psychologists resort
to speculation, and schools result. But, these schools
26. Art. (1935), 226. Cf. Hull, Art. (1937); Dunlap, Art.
(1925), 493: Holt, Art. (1937), 51; Pratt, 1MB, 131.
27. The Psychologies of 1925; The Psychologies of
1930. ' u
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"are scaffolding within which the structure of psychology
is "being erected, as necessary as the scaffolding and as
28
impermanent.
"
Attempts have "been made to secure the systematization
without adherence to any particular school. Operationism and
eclecticism are two such attempts. The use of formal crite-
ria to organize psychological data is a third. Each of these
attempts to unify, or at least to federate, the factions with-
in the realm of psychology, will he discussed. First, opera-
tionism and reactions to it will be outlined.
Agreement in psychology will he achieved when its concepts
are unequivocally defined. A concept is a shorthand way of
describing what happens in a given situation. A concept is
a symbol; it is nothing in itself. Confusion results when the
symbol comes to have a meaning of its own; Men insist on the
symbol, and schools of psychology result. But, define the
concept operationally — that is, in terms of the operations
involved in knowing it, and then the facts are dealt with. All
confusion resulting from championing one concept as against
another disappears, for facts are common property. Therefore,
"operational definitions can always transform a psychological
description, expressed in terms of consciousness, into a
29
description in behavioral or physiological terms." An exam-
ple of the clearing up of confusion by operationism is its
28. SP, 3; cf. 15; 13. Cf. Guthrie, Art.U933): "the
extent to which psychologists are divided into schools meas-
ures the extent to which psychology is not a science, but a
field of speculation." 137.
29. Boring, Art. (,1938), 94.
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handling of the mind-body problem. The set of defining
operations of body and of mind mutually coincide perfectly;
30
so mind and body are identical operationally.
Carroll C. Pratt, who, as will be pointed out below,
rejects operationism as a device to limit the subject matter
of psychology, finds operationism useful to restrain scientific
imagination. Psychological literature is filled with elaborate
guesses which substitute for knowledge. Sherrington's synapse
and mnemonic trace are examples of such guesses. These guesses
are formal. They are defined by material properties. Opera-
tional logic makes the meaning of such concepts explicit, and
thus helps to distinguish between good and bad guesses.
Here is where operationism can be of
practical value, namely, by placing
a ban on the sort of guessing which has
nothing to recommend it other than its
guess-like quality. 51
Several objections are raised against operationism. It
does not explain anything. It does not work. It is unscien-
tific. It is fruitless because of its metaphysical presuppo-
sition. Each of these objections will be cited in turn.
In the first place, Christian A. Ruckmick points out
that the least-common-denominator equivalence which opera-
tionism strives for has no real explanatory value.
It merely means that we have given up
explanation and interpretation at that
point of our thinking and for purposes
of expediency. >2
30. Cited by Bills, Art. (1938), 379 -
31. IMP, 121; 121ff., 135ff.
32. Art. (1938), 327.

. In the second place, the agreement promised by opera-
tionism is not realized in practice. Operationist Stanley
S. Stevens justifies subjective categories, such as experi-
ence, sensations, and sensorv attributes, while operationist
33
Jacob R. Kantor emerges with strict behavioral objectivity.
Pratt points out that the use of operational logic to retain
one kind of subject matter and to eliminate another abuses
this logical tool.
Acceptance of selected events as legiti-
mate subject matter for psychology, and
rejection of certain others, must there-
fore be based on some philosophical preju-
dice, not on any operational criterion.
In the third place, operationism is scientifically
sterile. What operationists regard as the strength of their
methodology, the re-wording of concerts in terms of operations
35
is a scientific weakness. A new set of symbols offers no
36
help for the problem of observation. Nor does operationism
have predictive value for psychology. In this respect it
shares in what Pratt calls, "the inescapable tautology of
strict scientific proposition." Scientific prediction involve
a contradiction. "A future event does not exist and cannot
37
be known by direct observation." Allport also denies the
predictive value of operationism, but for another reason. The
operations are abstracted from the operator. The concrete
33. Pointed out by Bills. Art. (1938), 387; cf. Stevens,
Art. (1935); Kantor, Art. (1938).
34. IMF, 93.
35. Cf. Janus, Art. (1940), 150.
36. Pratt, IMP, 90.
37. LMP, 155.
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person, ur>on whom operations in the future defend, is over-
38
looked in the interest of actuarial classification.
Finally, the charge is made that operationism has unmen-
tioned metaphysical presuppositions. In a survey indicating
the great methodological interest in psychology, Allport points
out "that the purveyor of methods is necessarily asking you
39
to accept his own frame of presuppositions." Operationism
is fruitless as a systematizer of psychology "because of its
skepticism of the validity of any generalization, for it rests
40
upon "metaphysical presuppositions of extreme nominalism."
The concept has no existence "beyond the operation which is
symbolized "by it.
Operationism illustrates the current effort to overcome
divisiveness in psychology. Yet, as Pratt states, it is far
41
from "being a "panacea for the ills of psychology." It has
not met with common acceptance, and has created new divisions.
Systematization of psychology by the postulational tech-
nique is another attempt to overcome divisiveness in psychology.
This proposes agreement upon common postulates, similar to those
of geometry, the interrelations of which shall constitute a
unified system. This sjrstematizing would not be strictly sci-
entific. It would be "a science of science," or philosophy.
Such a philosophy would have none of metaphysics in it, for the
propositions it would interrelate would be statements of fact
38. Art. ( 1940 )l
,
21; cf, ppi, 559.
39. Art.U940)1 , 20.
40. Art.U940)1 , 21.
41. 1MB, 81.
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about psychological processes. In its logical empiricism,
the postulational technique is an ally of operationism.
Eclecticism is also an attempt to bring some unity into
psychology. Protesting against the hard-and-fast closed systems
of the schools, Klein writes:
Judicious eclecticism in the choice and
application of explanatory principles,
even if this means an unfinished science,
seems to us to be preferable to partisan
attachment to a single principle in the
interests of a finished system .
However, an eclectic system seems to enlist the help of
all schools by means of some single principle to which it is
partisan. Thus, Klein regards purpose as the key to scien-
44
tific understanding in psychology. Allport regards the per-
son as a point of departure for psychology, and within this
45framework reconstructs general psychology. Stern writes
an Allgemeine Psychologie auf personalistische Grundlage .
Miss Calkins regards functionalism as nartial psychologv if
46
it is not personalistic functionalism. Elizabeth Duffy
can reduce all psychological categories to three because these
are sufficiently comprehensive
to account for all variations in psycho-
logical responses which are significant
in determining the quality of the behav-
ior as an ad justment . 47
In their text, Boring, Langfeld and Weld have as their point
42. Katsoff, Art. (1939), 62-70.
43. Art. (1930), 496.
44. See above, page 8.
45. PPI, 552.
46. EBP, 274-276.
47. These three are: (l) maintenance of direction of
behavior; (2) response to relationshins ; (3) energy level.
Art. (1941), 201.
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of departure the formulation of psychology as "a description
of man adjusting himself to his environment and his environ-
48
ment to himself."
It appears that the attempt to gather in the best of all
schools under one roof depends upon what is acceptable to the
host. Eclecticism unites in terms of subject matter, rather
than in terms of methodology. In the examples cited above,
purpose, person, and adjustment are explanatory concepts which
determine what the data are, and how they shall be interpreted.
Eclecticism needs an explanatory concept in order to have a
standard by which to be judicious in its choosing. Thus it
travels far in the direction of becoming a finished system the
like of which it set out to abolish.
A final illustration of the desire of psychologists to
have a systematic science rather than many systems is the use
of formal criteria to organize their data. For John A. McG-eoch,
By a system is meant, not an a priori
construct, but a coherent and inclusive,
yet flexible organization and interpretation
of the facts and special theories of psy-
chology.^"
The six formal criteria of system which he proposes include
consideration of postulational premises and metaphysical
48. IP, 627. Pointed out by Ericksen, Art. (1941), 79.
Cf. MacDonald, Art. (1931), 47.
49. Art. (1933), 11, 12.

50
foundations. In agreement with the position that unity
will come to psychology, not through a system, but "by a
systematic approach to the data, is Frank A. G-eldard. He hold
that science comes, not by systematizing descriptive material,
but by a systematic approach, dependent upon metaphysical
51
presuppositions, which brings the description into being.
This section and the one previous have dealt with the
current interest in psychological theory. The next section
discusses psychological theory and philosophy of psychology.
iii. Psychological Theory and Philosophy of Psychology .
Using Raymond R. Willoughby's index, psychological theory
would be classified as "internal systematization, " and phi-
losophy of psychology would be classified as "external
52
systematization.
"
Psychological theory consists of principles and laws
which establish relationships among psychological data, and
of a system that interrelates the principles and laws. Por
example, the law of habit and the stimulus-response principle
establish a relationship between the data of a driver's sensa-
tion of red and his applying pressure to the brake with his
right foot when he comes to a stop light. Some psychologists
50. The other four are: (l) criteria for the variety of
psychological data; (2) criteria for the character of psycho-
logical data: (3) principles of connection for organizing the
data; and (4) principles of selection for organizing the data.
See his Art. (1937) • 703f
.
, in which he embraces operationism.
51. Art. (1939), 414, 416.
52. Art. (1932), 180f.
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would consider the formation of connections and bonds between
situation and response as a sufficient explanation of these
data. Such psychologists systematize their laws and princi-
ples by the strict adherence to a mechanical casual sequence
On the other hand, there are psychologists who would
regard the law of habit and the stimulus-response formula as
descriptive of an unconscious mechanism which served the
individual as he carried on his self-directional activity.
Such psychologists systematize their laws and principles in
54
accordance with a presupposition of indeterminate purpose.
However, in both cases, the theory used to relate the
data is internal systematization. The law of habit is a
generalization of conditioned response data. The stimulus-
response formula is based upon observations of behavior. But
the internal systematization is in each case based upon diffe
ent views of human nature. In the first case, human nature
is mechanically conceived, whereas the second explanation
admits volitional causation within human nature. These pre-
suppositions are each a fulcrum upon which internal system-
atization pivots. They are a point of contact with external
systematization.
All psychological theory has implicit in it philosophi-
cal issues. Stern illustrates how closely allied are philoso
phy and psychology in his survey of areas mutual to both.
53. See below, pages 6f
.
,
9f.
54. See below, pages 7-9, 10.
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These areas include the questions, What is the mind? How is
55
it and the "body related? What of its destiny?
In answer to the first, the philosopher might regard
mind as substantial or as an attribute; the psychologist as
an aggregate of mental elements or as a stream of mental
processes. The second question finds philosophers divided
over a dualism of substance, or a monism, of either a materi-
alistic or spiritualistic sort. Psychologists of today "deny
the existence of the body-mind problem, the denial being
56
generally affected with the aid of Vienna logic;" or they
synthesize the components of the problem under a concept such
57
as "psychophysisch neutral." The question of the destiny of
the mind brings under consideration the roles of heredity and
environment, the issues of freedom and determinism, and the
belief in immortality. In addition to these metaphysical con-
siderations, psychology is involved in the epistemological
problem of how knowledge is possible, and the ethical dis-
58
tinction between right and wrong.
The effect of philosophical presuppositions upon psycho-
logical theorizing, indicated in the two previous sections,
also supports the statement that all psychological theory has
55. AG, 10-13; G-P, 6-9. The next paragraph follows Stern
closely.
56. Allport, Art. (1940), 3.
57. Stern, AG-, 12; GP, 8.
58. Eg., Lundholm, Art. (1940) deals with the psychological
self from an epistemological point of view. Lewis E. Hohn points
out that psychological facts are not philosoghical neutral. In
constructing a theory of knowledge, the psychological data
regarded as relevant depends upon the metaphysical outlook.
Art. (1942) 300f. A. P.'Weiss asserts: "For those who teach
courses in theoretical psychology, the philosophical problem
of reality constantly arises in one form or another." Art.(l9?l),
414
.
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implicit in it philosophical issu.es.
For example, the judgment of Higginson that "we can readi-
ly accept the categories of physics, chemistry, neurology and
59
physiology as explanatory agencies," excludes an idealistic
interpretation of psychological data, and favors a materialistic
60
one. Psychologists, such as Allport, Calkins, Stern, Klein,
Johnson, Guthrie and Winter regard the individual as determining,
in a measure, his own destiny. They include in one way or anoth-
er self-determinate purpose among their explanatory categories.
This excludes a materialistic interpretation of psychological
data, and favors an idealistic. Bills' and Bretscher's exclu-
sion of the purposing individual as a datum of scientific psy-
61
chology satisfies the positivistic "ban upon the supersenuous.
The extreme nominalism of operationism, giving to concepts sym-
bolic meaning at most, also favors positivism. Louis 0.
62
Katsoff bars metaphysics outright from systematic psychology.
Klein calls upon philosophy to evaluate the metaphysical
implications of psychology, otherwise they will continue to
obtrude themselves in disguised forms, to the confusion of
63
psychology. The advocacy of a formal framework to provide
for philosophical fulcra upon which psychology may be internally
systematized likewise is a recognition of the fact that all
64
psychological theory has implicit in it philosophical issues.
59. See above, page 11.
60. By idealism is meant the theory that reality involves
consciousness and purpose. Materialism means the theory that
physical nature, excluding purposing consciousness, alone is
real.
61. Positivism limits knowledge to sense objects; hence
consciousness and universals, which cannot be sensed, are not
regarded as knowable. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 215.
62. See above, page 2ff.. 15f.
,
63. Art.O-932)
,
v5BO-562. So also Grundlach, Art. (1929).
64. See above, page 17f.
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The philosophical presuppositions upon which the internal
systematization of psychology is "based are the points of con-
tact of psychological theory and philosophy of psychology.
Philosophy of psychology organizes psychological theory so as
to make philosophical implications explicit, and mutually
coherent in accordance with the point of view of the phil-
osophy of psychology. By doing this, philosophy of psycholo-
gy gives meaning to psychological data, to their principles and
laws, and the interrelations within a system of the principles
and laws. This meaning may be epistemological , ethical or
metaphysical; in any case, it involves value judgment. The
fact that philosophy of psychology is concerned with values of
truth, right and wrong, and of ultimate reality, is another
point of differentiation between it and psychological theory.
Psychological theory is so involved in human nature that
any application of it, such as educational psychology, sales
psychology, or therapeutic psychology, is productive of value.
But, in these cases, psychological theory has become instru-
mental. Taken alone, as the generalization of facts, the con-
struction of standards of prediction and control, and explana-
tion by lawful relationship to principle, psychological theory
has no primary interest in value as such. Value may be dealt
with in psychology, but it must be dealt with as fact, and not
as value itself. KcThler correctly protests that when value is
considered as end, scientific psychological atmosphere becomes
"stale and trivial." Psychologically, value for Kohler is merely
65
a part of the gestalt pattern. Nor is this psychological dis-
65. PVW, 85, 86.
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owing of value readily approved only where mechanical, deter-
ministic categories are alone admitted. Where categories of
self-determinate purpose are admitted, value is included only
as a fact. The value achieved, for example, in self-directional
activity yields scientific explanation only as it is construed
66
functionally within the personality process. Psychology
that abstracts values as ends from its consideration of human
nature has scientific status, for "interest in values distin-
67
guishes the philosophical from the scientific spirit."
However, this distinction between psychological theory
and philosophy of psychology does not create a sharp dualism.
68
"Pacts and values are not, in reality, separable;" nor are
they in thought. The philosophical presupposition which is
the fulcrum of an internal systematization determines the
69
philosophical interpretation of the data within the system.
This intercourse is reciprocal, for not only does philos-
ophy influence psychological theory, but the latter influences
philosophical speculation. For example, the philosophical
principle proposed in this dissertation is empirically condi-
tioned by the insights of Harvey Carr's functionalism, and
the personality studies of Ronald G-ordon, Gordon Allport,
66. Cf. Allport, PPI, 230f
.
, where values are regarded as
foci of development, and Spranger's Lebensformen , which neglect
empirical considerations, are criticised as being at best
categories of value.
67. Brightman, ITP, 12; cf. llf.
68. Brightman, ITP, 12.
69. See above, page
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70
Francis L. Strickland, Andras Angyal, and Wayland F. Vaughan.
It is this appropriation of the insights of empirical psy-
chology that saves philosophy of psychology from the "Abwegig-
keiten einer bloss spekulativen wirklichkeitsfernen Psychologie .
"
The comparison of psychological theory and philosophy of
psychology reveals a difference in approach to the facts. The
approach of psychological theory is internal. The facts give
rise to the system. The approach of philosophy of psychology
is external. A philosophical principle gives meaning to the
facts. A second difference is in the scope of subject matter.
Psychological theory regards value as fact. It explains value
in terms of the lawfulness of its relationships to other psy-
chological data. Philosophy of psychology regards value as
meaning. It invests the fact of value with the significance
72
of a philosophical point of view.
But these differences have a common point of contact.
The philosophical presupposition of an internal systematization
of psychology predisposes that systematization toward a philo-
sophical point of view favorable to or permitted by the pre-
supposition. Reciprocally, psychological theory influences
70. See Chapter II below. Flewelling credits psychology
with having "cleared the field of superstition and false imagina
tion" with respect to the idea of the soul. Art. (1928), 54.
Psychology has provided many illustrations for philosophical
speculation. For example, John W. Scott sees in psychotherapeu-
tic integration a concrete instance of the self-realization of
the Hegelian Absolute. Art. (1923); cf. Art. (1921) and Art. (1922)
Bowne used the experience of self-consciousness as an analogy to
justify metaphysical monism (THE, 175), and as a condition for
thought in his epistemology (TTK, 20-23). Henry A. Murray
identifies a concrete moment of experience with an 'actual
entity 1 of Whitehead. Art. (1936), 255. Cf. AllDort, PPI , 349.
71. Stern, AP, 13; GP, 9.
72. Cf. Stern, AP, 25-27; GP, 17-19.
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philosophical speculation.
4. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter has been to present the
formal limits and extent of philosophy of psychology. At the
outset, the following definition of philosophy of psychology
was proposed:
The interpretation of psychological data
and theory according to a philosophical
principle derived from psychological data
and theory constitutes the philosophy of
psychology. 73
From the discussion in this chapter, the following conclusions
are reached:
The philosophy of psychology, philosophical psychology,
and scientific psychological theory all use philosophical
principles. Philosophical psychology makes psychological
data and theory amenable to its philosophical point of view.
Scientific psychological theory assumes some philosophical
principle as the ground for an empirical internal system-
atization of psychological data. Philosophy of psychology
gives meaning to the data and theories by relating them to
a philosophical principle.
This philosophical principle is conditioned by empirical
data and theories. Here philosophy of psychology differs
from philosophical psychology, and shares an investigative
spirit with scientific psychology. But the investigative
spirit of the latter is limited by the exclusion of values
as ends from its data. Philosophy of psychology includes
the consideration of values as such (or non-values), for
73. See above, page 1.
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these are the mainspring of all philosophical speculation.
Hence, philosophy of psychology is "broader than psychology.
Since the philosophical principle of philosophy of
psychology is inductively related to psychological data and
theory it is akin in this respect to psychological theory,
and in disagreement with philosophical psychology.
Since philosophy of psychology gives ultimate meaning
to psychological data and theory "by relating them to a philo-
sophical principle, it is akin in this respect to philosophi-
cal psychology, and in disagreement with psychology. The
latter is not interested in interpretation in terms of ulti-
mate meaning, but in explanation in terms of lawful relation-
ships.
The definition of philosophy of psychology, and the re-
lationships it "bears to philosoDhical psychology, and psycho-
logical theory, have in this chapter been formal. The next
chapter proposes an empirical basis for philosophy of psy-
chology.

CHAPTER II
THE EMPIRICAL BASIS OF
A PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
Philosophy of psychology is the interpretation of
psychological data and theory according to a philosophical
principle which is derived from the data and theory. This
chapter proposes four principles thus derived. These princi-
ples are complementary. Psychological data and theory, as
systematized by the four complementary principles, constitute
the empirical basis of philosophy of psychology.
The principles are: (1) the principle of psycho-physical
correlation; (2) the principle of instrumental behavior;
(o) the principle of value response; (4) the ego principle.
It is the purpose of this chapter to present data and
theory sufficient to establish the four principles.
1. PSYCHO-PHYSICAL CORRELATION
i. Statement of the Principle. The strict correlation
of mental and physical processes is the central explanatory
concept in Gordon 1 s study of personality.
Every mental process however complicated,
however abstract, is correlated with an
activation of certain nerve cells, and of
certain muscles and glands. Every
activation of a group of neurones, however
simple, is correlated with a mental
reaction.
1
1. PER. 23.
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Gordon pictures the growth of personality as the neural
integration and association of reflex arcs, starting with
the simple inherited reflex responses, and by continuous
conditioning, reaching engrams which have complicated phe-
nomena, such as ideation, as their mental aspects. For Gor-
don, the mind does not have a body, in the manner of self-
psychology. Nor, is the mind reduced to body, as the be-
haviorist would have it. Rather, mind and body are mental
and physical aspects of the organism as a whole. Methodo-
logical limitations make it necessary to treat each aspect
separately in its relation to environment . Gordon recog-
nizes the limitations of psycho-physical correlation as an
explanatory concept, for he acknowledges an "immaterial
2
aspect" of personality,
Gordon* s interpretation of psycho-physical correlation
with respect to the mind-body problem is not a necessary
part of the principle itself. The principle itself is non-
committal as to the nature of the relation of mind and body.
The principle is valid whether "an explosive clutter of
3
sound" exhausts the significance of the spoken word, or
whether larnygeal responses are the machinery of man T s
4
creative activity. The mind may be body, or the body may
be an instrument of the mind, but in either case, the fact
2. Cf. PER. 6, 27, 28, 288, 291.
3. Watson, US, 97.
4. Cf. Allen, Art. (1940), 652; Calkins, FBP, 277; and
Brightman»s definition of psychology in ML, 25.

of psycho-physical correlation is not affected. So long
as there is an organism that mediates between stimulus and
response, physiological psychology is possible, and psycho-
physical correlation obtains in some sense.
ii. Instances of Correlation. Psycho-physical corre-
lation is illustrated by the influence of neural structure
upon mental life. For example, the constancy of intelli-
gence quotients for each individual points to an inherited
cerebral difference as the source of the psychological
difference. This psycho-physical correlation has been
confirmed by a small but positive correlation between alpha
frequency and intelligence level on the electroencephalogram.
Further, only as myelin sheaths grow do intelligence and
motor coordination make progress. An underdeveloped contral
nervous system means retarded personality. Talents, also,
are due to inherited facilitated neural connections. And
old age brings with it shrinkage of the brain and the
6
appearance of senile dementia.
The glandular system likewise is an important factor
in mental life. For example, thyroid deficiency causes
cretinism. Both physical and mental development follow with
the administration of thyroxine. On the other hand, hyper-
thyroidism elongates the skeleton and greatly increases
nervous excitability. This can be cured by surgical removal
5. Knott, Art. (1934), 949; cf. Art. (1942).
6. Cf. Woodworth, AM, 81, 117; Allport, PPI, 148f. and
Gordon, PER, 51, 127-130, 274.
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of some of the gland tissue. Gigantism and acromegaly
result from overactivity of the anterior lobe of the pitui-
tary gland. During menopause, the adjustment of bodily
functions to the lack of puberty hormones occasions nervous
7
tension.
Emotional experience depends upon physiological conditions.
Although the James-Lange theory locates the source of bodily
changes in the viscera rather than the hypothalamus, the fact
8
remains that the mental experience is physical in its basis.
The physical basis of mental experience is evident in
most cases of illness and disease. There is a correlation
9
between "brain waves" and the unpleasantness of a headache.
Some nervous and mental patients respond better to treatment
that is physical rather than psychotherapeutic. Trigant
Burrows reports that the education of kinesthetic coordination
is a more fundamental procedure for some mental patients than
10
psychic or symbolic education. Kurt Goldstein observes that
11
lesions in the frontal lobe result in extreme introversion.
7. This follows Vaughan, GP, 186ff.
8. Cf. Vaughan, GP, 208ff. Elec troencephalographic
experiments support_the theory that the hypothalamus is the
center of emotion ^Hunt, Art. (1941), 266f 1/
r
.
Edwin D. Star-
buck regards the hypothalamus as the center of evaluation,
and the cortex as a mechanism serving the hypothalamus
^rt. (1942), 446/.
"~ 9. So Max, Art. (1940), 494. So impressed by the results
of electroencephalography is John R. Knott that he proposes its
records be accepted as a measure of "neurophysiological events
that » are 1 psychological process." /Art. (1941), 9697.
10. Art. (1943), 114.
11. HNLP, 66, 67.
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In some cases, depressed patients increase their psycho-
motor activity and experience an emotional uplift after a
12
lobotomy has been performed.
The effects of drugs upon motor and mental efficiency
also shows the dependence of psychological processes upon
the physiological state of the organism. Alcohol reduces
efficiency. Benzedrine and caffeine, taken in proper amounts,
increase efficiency. Barbiturates, aspirin, bromides, opiates
(in non-addicts) are depressant. Cannabis distorts per-
13
ception of time and space.
The effects of neural and glandular functioning, and
of disease and drugs, upon mental life indicate the inextri-
cable relationships of mind and body. Brain structure
and blood chemistry are necessary for mental life, and, in
the words of Woodworth, "good brain structure and good
blood chemistry are undoubtedly necessary for normal mental
14
activity."
iii. Correlation an Inference. The physiological
structure involved in psycho-physical correlation is still
largely a matter of speculation. The well-known synapse is,
15
as Pratt indicates, a scientific guess. Allport assigns
12. However, hallucination continues, intellectual
capacities remain the same, and visual memory may decrease.
Cf. Yacorzynski and Davis, Art. (1943), 493f.; and V/archel
and Lyerly, Art. (1940), 545.
13. Spragg, Art. (1941), 355-357.
14. AM, 120.
15. See above, page 13. •
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16
it to the "limbo of scientific mystery." Gordon admits
that the nature and structure of the highest levels of
neural integration, which correspond to the most compli-
cated reactions of man, must be inferred from analogy to
17
simple reflexes. Lashley, whose experiments show that a
neural pattern is better understood as a dynamic relation
or ratio among neurones than as the specific transcortical
connections of the "nerve pathway" theory, states that "the
mode of interaction of the different parts of the cerebral
cortex is still obscure after a century of experimental
18
study of the brain." As Clarence I. Lewis points out, "the
relation between mental phenomena and behavior or brain states
19
is something which can be inferred only deductively."
However, ignorance of the details of physiological
structure does not negate the validity of the principle of
psycho-physical correlation. William pepperill i'.iontague
calls psycho-physical correlation "verifiable, predictable,
and in a large measure controllable" by drugs, glandular
20
extracts, and surgery; and as William E. Hocking observes,
every extension of knowledge confirms it and makes it more
21
precise. Brain structure and blood chemistry, plus their
16. ?PI, 140.
17. PER, 62.
18. Art. (1942), 197; Cf. 219, and Bill, 272.
19. Art. (1941), 230.
20. HIT, 541.
21. TDL, 42.
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proper mental phenomena, constitute the subject matter of
psychology. Logically, the principle may be an inference,
but the facts supporting the inference are sufficiently
strong to make this principle a basic explanatory concept
22
in psychology.
However, the basic nature of the principle of psycho-
physical correlation does not exclude complementary princi-
ples, equally basic, derived from other areas of psychologi-
cal investigation. A one-sided emphasis upon psycho-physical
correlation results in such absurdity as explaining mature
personality in terns of the automatic reactions of a decorti-
cated cat. For this reason, observes Alloort, so many edu-
23
cated people view psychology as "a sappy science." Guthrie
expresses the limitation of the principle of psycho-physical
correlation graphically. No autopsy, he declares, "will ever
show whether or not the accident victim intended to post his
wife's letter in his pocket, or whether he preferred pinochle
24
to bridge." The principle of instrumental behavior, derived
from another aspect of mental life, will be considered next.
2. INSTRUMENTAL BEHAVIOR
i. Statement of the Principle. The principle of instru-
mental behavior may be formulated thus: The individual pos-
sesses certain mental reactive equipment which serves as a
22. Thus, for example, Allport feels the need to postulate
on admittedly meager evidence a neurophysical basis for his
doctrine of traits. P?I, 339.
23. PPI, 215.
24. Art. (1933), 129.
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means to some end. Such psycho-physical equipment includes
motor-response, perception, imagination, thinking, appre-
ciation and consciousness. By means of such psychological
functions, the organism mobilizes its resources for action.
The function of each of the instruments of behavior mentioned
will be briefly described.
Motor response provides direct means for reacting to
stimuli.
Perception registers the environment in a form which
can be of use to the individual.
By imagination the individual can deal with objects in
the absence of their sensory stimuli. The barriers of space
and time thus overcome, perspective is possible and the
possibilities for action by the individual increased.
Thought is the capacity to see relationships among stimuli.
Seeing new relationships in old patterns of experience as these
enter into new situations broadens the scope and extends the
25
effectiveness of the individual in accomplishing his end.
The mental process of appreciation serves the individual
by judging the value or disvalue to him in any situation.
"Peeling, while it always accompanies percepts, images or
ideas, is nevertheless in the last analysis the basis upon
26
which we determined the value of these images or ideas... ."
25. As Brand Blanshard points out, thought may have "an
end of its own, " the pursuit of intellectual integrity, "a
pilgrimage which, if pressed, would take us everywhere else."
NT, I, 593, 690. But, this "pursuit" is an ideal, rather than
instrumental behavior. See below, page 43.
26. Strickland, PRE, 169.
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The emotional experience of appropriating values and reject-
ing disvalues depends upon our appreciation of what in a
situation will further the ends of the individual.
The function of consciousness is to enable the individual
to make adequate adjustment to the more complex conditions in
a situation. It emerges only as it is needed. The simplest
conflict situation, involving alternatives of action, requires
it. V.hen a purpose is chosen for action, psycho- functional
mechanisms execute the purpose, and so long as nothing hinders
their operation, consciousness is not needed. "....Voile
Bewusstheit
. • . ist nur notig an Knotenpunkten des Geschehens
/of choice or decision7, dort, wo Keramungen eintreten und Ent-
scheidungen neu getroffen werden mussen....;" otherwise, the
psychological functions are organized into habit and set, which
are able to carry out the chosen purpose without conscious
28
participation of the individual.
i i . Garr 1 s and Angyal
'
s Use of the Principle. The princi-
ple of instrumental behavior is an important part of Harvey
Carr's functionalism and AndrasjAng^cal ' s science of personality.
Carr views the course of human life as the adjustment of
"the organism's motivating needs, its immediate environment,
29
and its reactive equipment." Psychology should view the in-
30
dividual "from the standpoint of his reactive possibilities;"
2V. Stern, AP, 583; GP, 422f. Cf. AP, 106f.; GP, 76.
28. C.S. Myers, Art. (1931), 746.
29. PSY, 87. Heidbreder regards this book as representa-
tive of mature functionalism. SP, 219.
30. PSY, 338.
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it nust avoid the "naive assumption" that mental activity as
31
directed toward any self-chosen goal. Perceptual-motor
equipment and reasoning include all reactive possibilities.
Carr's functionalism rests upon two premises: (1) The
course of an individual's life is determined by organic needs
and environmental demands; (2) mental activity is the instru-
ment for satisfying these needs and demands. The second
premise is the principle of adaptive behavior.
.Angyal bases his theory of personality upon a two-fold
principle: The organism expands at the expense of the environ-
32
ment, and at the same time it is absorbed by the environment.
The first aspect of this principle fits "biologically chaotic
items of the environment into the organization of the individ-
33
ual*s life; the second aspect fits the individual into social
34
groups, the conceptual world, and the cosmos.
In this theory, mental reactive equipment functions as
the meeting place of organism and environment. The white
bird we see is a psychological symbol which means the actual
white bird. Psychological processes operate with such
35
symbols
.
In the psychological realm life takes
place, not through the interaction of
31. PSY, 80.
32. FSP, 30ff; 48; 172ff.
33. Ibid., 174
34. Ibid., 172
35. Ibid., 62f; 56.
3£
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the concrete individual with a concrete
environment ... but by the interaction
of symbols representing the individual
and the environment .36
Psychological activity provides the tools for this interaction.
It provides means for expanding upon the biological environment,
37
and means for becoming absorbed into the cultural environment
.
By regarding mental reactive equipment in this instrumental
light, Angyal makes use of the principle of adaptive behavior.
iii. Some Formal Aspects of the Principle. There are at
least two formal aspects of the principle of instrumental
behavior. The first is that this principle is non-committal
as to what psychological processes function for. This is
apparent from Carr's ana Angyal's use of the principle. For
Carr, they function in the interests of biological and environ-
mental determinism. For Angyal, psychological processes fill
out the potentialities of the principle underlying the individ-
ual's activities. 'The principle of instrumental behavior claims
that whatever may be regarded as the end of human activity,
whether it be the ripening of ivlcDougall s instincts, the satis-
faction of Thorndike's wants, Freud's life-instinct, Horney's
desire for security, Lewin's field stresses, Tolman's inter-
vening variables, '.Voodworth's specific interests, or Allport's
functions which have achieved autonomy,— these ends are
realized through the instrumentality of the individual's mental
56. FSP, 77.
37. Ibid., 78ff.
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reactive equipment.
A second formal aspect of the principle of instrumental
behavior is its neutrality with respect to the manner in which
mental reactive equipment functions. Percepts, for example,
may be composed of elements, or they may be Gestalten. Watson
may be right in calling thinking sub-vocal talking, or Wood-
worth may be right in saying that words are useful as thought-
saving devices. Emotion may be an aspect of an inherited
propensity, according to McDougall; or it may depend upon a
contemporary organic condition, not related to any instinct,
as in the James-Lange tradition. But, whatever may constitute
perception, thought, and appreciation, they remain the way in
which some end is achieved.
iv. Some Positive Implications of the Principle. The
principle of instrumental behavior is not merely formal, how-
ever. In the first place, it places a limit upon the princi-
ple of psycho-physical correlation. The principle of instru-
mental behavior implies that the physiological correlate
depends for its activation upon the individual's use of his
reactive equipment. As James B. Pratt observes, "the physical
event must always follow the physical event with which it is
correlated," and hence "it must be regarded as caused by the
58
psychical event." Physiological structure supporting
psychological functioning depends upon the latter for its
38. MS, 69, 70; cf. 186.
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significance in behavior, Mental phenomena are not epiphe-
nomena; they exist in their own right as valid subject
matter for psychology. This fact rules out any theory, such
as strict behaviorism, which ignores mental phenomena, or
which regards them as secondary to physiological functioning.
A second consequence of the temporal priority of
psychological functioning over physiological structure is
that a norm for determining the lower limit of mental life
is suggested. Wherever the human organism can deal with the
environment other than by direct contact, mental life exists.
Processes of digesting food, absorbing inhaled oxygen, thermal
and pressure adjustments, for example, are direct contacts
with the environment, and do not require psycho-functional
equipment for their existence. Such processes are extra-mental
39
biological adaptation. On the other hand, the retinal image
is not the book I reach to pick up. My pain in the stomach
is not my stomach. Adrenalin in the blood may be a physio-
logical condition for anger, but I do not feel the blood or
adrenalin. The half dollar I touch in my pocket occupies no
40
real space in my consciousness. In these cases, the psycho-
logical processes operate with symbols. When the environment
39. However, they have mental correlates. For example,
Nathan W. Shock reports that although simple sensory and
motor response are not seriously impaired until collapse from
lack of oxygen approaches, a slight deprivation causes grave
errors in judgment. Art. (1939), 448.
40. Cf. Brightman, Art. (1939), 138.
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yields symbols significant to the individual, mental life
exists
•
The principle to be discussed next deals with value
response.
3. THE PRINCIPLE OF VALUE RESPONSE
j. Statement of the principle. According to Francis L.
Strickland, "our response and attitude toward the world is
41
determined by its value to us." This is the principle of
value response.
The world is of value to us when, in our commerce with
it, needs are met and desires satisfied. An unanalyzable
feeling of pleasure accompanies the realization of value.
This feeling identifies the value realized as our own.
"...emotional experiences are symbols of value-laden, ego-
42
relevant facts." It is by feeling- judgment, or appreciation,
that we realize values immediately, in a first-hand way.
ii. Social Approval and Interioriged Social Values. The
physical comfort of the organism is the mark of the realiza-
tion of values on a biological level. The organism seeks to
avoid the discomfort of hunger, violence, and fear, and to
relieve sexual tension. This is "the utmost reach of a strictly
43
biological ideal." Success here constitutes value experience.
41. CN, 1936-1937.
42. Ang$., FSP, 73.
43. Gilbert, Art. (1923), 296.
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Although biological tendencies "mold both our ideals and our
44
conduct," in civilized circumstances biological behavior is
45
thoroughly socialized. The socialized world contains two
conditions for value experience. One is social approval. The
other is social resistance.
Social approval is one of the needs of the human indi-
vidual. His responses are in a large measure what his group
46
elicits from him. "The individual may modify the group
and its culture to some extent, but lie does not make them so
47
much as they make him." He learns what his culture is in
terms of what is or is not socially acceptable. Under the
powerful influence of social suggestion he accepts these
prevailing norms long before he has the ability critically
to examine them. These prevailing norms Hadley Cantril calls
48
social values.
Social values become personal values when a person feels
that he has measured up to what society expects of him in his
situation. This feeling marks his social status in his own
49
eyes. The prevailing norms have become his norms. He is
44. Brightman, PI, 144.
45. Cf., e.g., the pervasive social ramifications of
sexuality. Allport, PPI, 188.
46. So Strickland, CN, 1936-1937.
47. V/oodworth, ALI, 136. The overbearing influence of
society upon the individual receives recognition in an ex-
treme form in Carl Jung's doctrine of the racial unconscious.
MMSS 48, 214, 241; PR, 64.
48. PSM, 7. Cantril does not make use of the psychology
of suggestion to explain interiorization, which he regards as
a "relatively unknown process." PSlvi, 5. Stern calls this
process Introzeption
. AP, 102, 421; GP, 73, 307.
49. Cf. Cantril, PSM, 42.
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a carrier of social value. His response toward the social
milieu in which he lives was determined by this felt need.
Society is of value to him because it has met his need.
For the most part, personal values are largely interioriz
social values. As Allport states,
a few conventional habits, some fossils
of ancestral political-economic beliefs,
a handful of superstitions, a vocabulary
of cliches, a simple T.7e1 1an schauung , serve
most people to their satisfaction. oO
vVhere this is the case, a person's response and attitude
toward the world is determined almost entirely by his desire
for social approval. Thus, he must maintain social norms,
51
or become abnormal. Loss of social status is a threat to
personal security. Social disapproval causes emotional
tension, which, if not relieved by facing the facts and mak-
ing some adequate adjustment, will be relieved by such
devices as rationalization, projection, compensations,
52
phantasy, repression, hysteria, amnesia or fugue.
Kurt Goldstein regards the alternation of social adjust-
ment and social maladjustment with respect to social approval
as the process of real self-actualization. To come to terms
with other actualizers is the "one motive by ?;hich human
53
activity is set going." This process is to be identified
53
with the needs of the organism.
50. PPI, 144. Social stability is due in part to the
pressure toward conformity exerted by the desire for social
approval. So Cantril, PSM, 15.
51. Cantril, PST.I, 42.
52. So Strickland, CN, 1936-1937.
53. HNLP, 167; cf. 167-174.

This one-sided emphasis upon the individual's need for
social approval overlooks, in Cantril's phrase, "the indi-
vidual as a selective agent." As Cantril points out, all
people do not "accept uncritically the norms and values
54
surrounding them in their usual cultural group. To them,
the cultural group becomes a source of resistance to the
realization of their own ideals.
iii. Ideals and Social Resistance. Social resistance
is a consequence of ideal motivation. An ideal is an idea
which is chosen as a motive of action. It is broad, covers
55
much of life, is emotionalized, and relatively permanent.
When a person's total outlook on life has several mutually
harmonious ideals as its aspect, this organized totality is
56
the person's ideal of personality, or ego-ideal.
Every mature personality may be said to
travel toward a port of destination,
selected in advance, or to several
related ports in succession, the Ego-
ideal always serving to hold the
course in view. 57
Religion generally provides such an all-inclusive ideal, for
religious interest seeks the value underlying all other
58
values. But, every ideal has implicit in it "a vision of
59
some sort of possible whole of experience.
54. PSM, 11.
55. So Strickland, CN, 1936-1937.
56. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 142, and Pi, 71.
57. Allport, PPI, 219. Cf. Calkin's "governing purpose,"
FBP, 242.
58. Allport, PPI, 226.
59. Brightman, PI, 71.
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When an ideal is put into action, ideal values result.
This requires what Stern calls "personale Leistung."
Sie ist zu definieren als: Werteschaffung
durch Viillenshandlung unter Aufwand
personaler Kraft .
^
Personal force consists of mobilizing the organism* s energies
' 61
and its instrumental dispositions, to fulfill the demands of
62
the ideal.
In the pursuit of ideals, the desire for social approval
becomes part of the objective ground for their realization.
For example, an artiste work must be more than "einer blossen
Aussenoro jektion einer Personlichkeit . ... Er /h~at7 es mit
63
der Welt zu tun ... ." This objective factor provides the
resistance that provides the condition for the achievement of
an ideal. On the level of ideal motivation, our response and
attitude toward the world is determined by its resistance
value to us.
The need for such an objective condition William E.
Hocking regards as the psychological foundation of the state.
The state provides permanence that makes the past useful and
the future calculable. It provides an objective ground into
which personal performance may be knit, and "last while it
60. AP, 640; OP, 461.
61. "Rustungsdispositionen" are roughly equivalent to
the functions of instrumental behavior (pages 33 #. above/-'),
62. Strickland defines "will" as the mobilization of
energy. Cf. Allport's principle of convergence, PPI, 346,
and Stern, "V/ollen verbraucht Energie;" AP, 583; OP, 422.
63. Stern, AP, 502; GP, 364.
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lasts. Further, the ideal must face the crucial test of
eventual acceptance or rejection, and the idealizer the
social consequences of his performance. If he does not, he
must relinquish his ideal. Then, any of the defense
65
mechanisms mentioned above may operate to deaden the pain
of failure.
iv. Ratio of Response to Social Approval and Ideal
Motivation. When personal performance is predominantly an
acceptance of one's status within the social structure, there
is little social resistance. Low ideal motivation means
social approval is the main source of value in the group.
But, on the other hand, when one's ideals are at variance
with the status the group takes on resistance value. The
greater the variance is, the greater is the resistance value.
However, there is no clear cut line of demarcation
between motivation by social approval and ideal motivation.
The most thoroughgoing iconclast must accept a large measure
of socially approved standards. If he does not, he loses
contact with his group, and it loses value to him as the
objective ground for working out his ideals. If he alone,
for example, kept appointments on the basis of a day divided
into twenty-six units instead of the conventional twenty-
four, his functioning within his group would be seriously
handicapped. "Society has had some part in the forming of
64. MS, 326.
65. Page 42.
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the most individualistic, eccentric and anarchistic of
66
ideals." On the other hand, the desire to conform socially
may be an ideal.
Our response and attitude toward the world is determined
by its value to us. The nature of this value depends upon
the degree of variance with the status quo our ideal demands
of us. The more we desire social approval, the more our
response and attitude is one of social conformity. The
farther away from conformity our ideal leads us to move, the
more resistance value our group has to us.
v. Some Objections to the Principle. The principle of
value response is not acceptable from several standpoints. A
comparison of the principle with these different points of
view will serve to clarify the significance of the principle.
For one thing, the value response principle is not
compatible ^» psychological theory that denies ideal motivation.
Strictly biologically oriented theories make this denial.
For example, Carr regards the life process as developing by
reaction to environment, with no purposeful direction toward
67
any chosen goal. Alex Brett seeks to naturalize value
experience by making good and evil equivalent to good or
68
poor adjustment to environment. For Goldstein, the life
process consists of the organism coming to terms with
66. Brightman, PI, 73.
67. PSY, 80.
68. Art. (1941), 702f.
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environment. In reply to such objections, it may be
pointed out that the principle of value response takes
cognizance of biological and social adjustment, but it
broadens the scope of value experience to include the satis-
faction of the demands arising from ideal motivation.
Further, the principle of value response is in disagree-
ment with the field theory of personality. Ko'hler states
that "value-situations fall under the category of gestalt."
This gestalt is a total field including "a self-interested-
in-one-definite-thing." The self cannot be abstracted from
the field and value referred to it; value experience is part
70
of the total field. But, according to Kantor, gestalt
field is "not the genuine article," because it still deals
71
with experiential or conscious phenomena. Real field
theory, Kantor states, regards fields as loci of the inter-
behavior of response and stimulus functions. Neither internal
principles nor neural functioning are permitted any place in
71
field formulation.
The principle of value response recognizes that the
individual cannot be understood apart from his social context.
The individual has a social correlate apart from which he
could not exist on a human level. Arthur D. Ritchie* s state-
' 69. HNLP, 167.
70. PVW, 86, 75.
71. Art. (1941), 37; 31-38.
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ment carries an acceptable emphasis:
The study of mind is the study of
man's behavior in his environment,
an environment that consists of
other persons before it consists of
things. 72
However, the principle of value response claims, as against
the field theory, that man's behavior is his environment is
man's behavior, and not the environment's. This behavior
is determined by the value the environment has for him as
he seeks to meet his needs and satisfy his desires.
The principle of value response is also unacceptable to
the Freudian scheme. According to Freud, the desire to do
what your life-instinct demands you should do is inhibited
by social convention. Thus there is a conflict between the
73
Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle. In contrast
to this, the principle of value response regards the social
structure as an opportunity for the individual to satisfy
his desires; and the feeling of pleasure is not an incentive
to action, but a consequence of action that satisfies desire.
vi. Some Formal Aspects of the Principle. In at least
two respects the principle of value is non-committal. It
passes no judgment upon the structure of motivation, nor
upon the ethical quality of values.
The structure of motivation does not affect the validity
72. NHM, 278.
73. EI, 15, 30, 55, 56.
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of the principle of value response. For example, neither
74
possible outcome of the Allport-Bertocci debate on the
respective merits of functional autonomy and the McDougall
tendency theory would disturb the fact that our response
and attitude toward the world is determined by its value
to us. This will be true whether motives are self-sustain-
ing contemporary systems, or inherited tendencies; or, for
that matter, even the product of a faculty of reason or
free will.
The principle of value response is ethically neutral.
As Allport points out in his criticism of 3pranger ! s ideal
types, "hedonistic, sensual and vital values are the foci
75
of development in many personalities. The exploiter of
society and the social altruist both seek social approval
and resistance to carry out their respective ideals. The
bandit, for example, seeks to accumulate wealth, and wealth
is a social value. Unless money were socially approved,
there would be no point to robbery. The altruist, seeking
to effect the maximum sharing of social value, also operates
within the social fabric. Anti-social activity of the
banait and the pro-social activity of the audit are both at
variance with the status quo
. In both cases, the group
provides resistance value.
74. Allport, Art. (1940); Bertocci, Art. (1940).
75. PFI, 231. cf. Erightman, PI, 57, G4, 76.
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vii. Some Implications for Ethical Theory, Although
the principle of value response is itself ethically neutral,
it contains two implications for ethical theory. The first
implication grows out of the fact that the principle recog-
nizes the existence of value experience, and the fact that
ideals direct conduct. As Ko*hler states, the sense of
obligation which is involved in valuation occurs "as a
psychological reality since it operates in mental life, and
has, even beyond it, many effects which everybody would call
76
facts." The experience of value and the sense of obliga-
tion, involved in ideal motivation, are two foundation pillars
77
of ethical theory.
The second implication grows out of the fact that the
principle of value response makes all value experience
relative to the social structure. The value experience
"depends upon the type of civilization which exists at the
78
time;" it is relative to social approval. Further, were
there no society to provide resistance, there could be no
79
realization of value; it is relative to social resistance.
76. PVWF, 54. This sense of obligation, or 'required-
ness,» has a cortical counterpart, according to Kohler. 194.
195. A,
77. So Brightman, ML, 62ff. The third is the fact that
we universalize our experience into law.
78. Weiss, Art. (1932), 127. Weiss is a behaviorist.
79. Cf. Brightman, ML, 220ff. The alternative to achiev-
ing value is ultimate despair. So Brightman, ML, 22.
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Whether a person conforms to social norms, or whether he
varies from them, he still operates with social structure as
his realm of discourse. The principle of value response
lends itself to ethical relativism, so far as the content
of value experience is concerned.
4. THE EGO PRINCIPLE
i. Statement of the Principle. The ego principle nay
be formulated thus: Within a world the individual accepts
as real he refers his memories of past experience to his
present, self-enhancing purposes. Self-consciousness is
the result of this reference.
Self-consciousness, writes Allport, "provides each of
us with the one and only sure criterion of our -oersonal
80
existence and identity. It develops gradually, and is a
difficult achievement. This achievement depends upon memory
development, differentiation of emotional responses, use of
language, and the possession of anchorage points, such as
81
one's name and social status. Children become conscious
of "self" when interest is organized around what is called
"my." Cantril defines the ego as a concept that describes
82
Y«hat each person subjectively regards as me." The vivid-
ness of sensation when "me" is the object of reference, and
80. PPI, 159.
81. Allport, PPI, 159-165.
82. PSM, 40f.
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the presence of a sense of value at this moment, Strickland
83
calls the two aspects of self-consciousness.
The ego principle describes the self-conscious func-
tioning of personal identity, Eut consciousness, once it
has emerged, is not continuous. Sleep, narcotics, injuries,
and absorption in what one is doing may lessen or completely
eliminate conscious functioning. There is no empirical
84
evidence that consciousness survives death. "...The human
85
self is fragmentary, incomplete, interrupted."
However, the very fragmentariness throws into bold
relief the fact of self-conscious unity. The ego principle
is an analytic statement of self-conscious experience. In
it three factors are involved, namely: (1) past experience;
(2) self-enhancement; (3) and reality feeling. Each of these
will be discussed in turn.
ii. The Influence of Past Experience. The influence of
past experience may be conscious or unconscious. 7/here it
is conscious, purposes are chosen after a conscious consider-
ation of response patterns which the person recognizes as
characteristically his own. Unconscious influence exists
when insight into one's motives for an act, or into one's
83. Strickland, ON, 1936-1937.
84. Gf. Hocking, TDL, 3: "The problem of the survival
of death by human persons is an empirical problem for which
we have no empirical evidence."
85. Brightman, ITP, 196; cf. Laird, SR, 177.
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reasons for a belief, is lacking.
This interrelationship of past and present purposes
makes of the individual more than a mere aggregate of
87
sensations, ideas, and feelings; he is a "living unity."
This unity at any given time is the person's character for
88
that time. The felt coherence between memories of the
past and plans for the future is the strongest bond of per-
89
sonal unity.
When the course of action under consideration is com-
patible with previously accepted purpose patterns, self-
consciousness is much less acute than when the course of
action is at variance with past conduct. The latter situa-
tion requires rational reflection, the most intense condition
of self-consciousness. In the former situation, self-con-
sciousness may even be lacking, as in the case of intuition
and inspiration, where it seems that the intuition or inspi-
ration has come from an outside source. Here past experiences
are an unconscious influence. Such experiences as intuition,
inspiration, conviction of belief, and problems that solve
86. Other meanings of the concept of the unconscious
include: unawareness of, unresponsiveness and inattentive-
ness to, stimuli; inability to remember repressed desires;
unawareness of anything, as dreamless sleep; unawareness of
environment, as sleep with dreaming; and co-consciousness,
as in "split" personalities. Cf. Miller, U1TC, 23-44.
87. So Moore and Gurnee, PP, 159.
88. Gf. Gordon, PER, 2.
89. So Allport, PPI, 345.
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themselves are the result of an unconscious drawing upon
vast areas of past experience for their immediate con-
90
elusions
.
Freudian "wish" psychology has popularized the uncon-
scious influence of past experience in another direction.
Re-ores sed motivational systems unconsciously influence con-
91
duct, as the facts of abnormal psychology abundantly show.
iii. Self-enhancement. A second fact involved in the
experience of self-consciousness is the desire of the indi-
vidual to increase his value in his own eyes and in the eyes
of others. This desire Wayland F . Vaughan calls self-
enhanc ement
.
There is a will-to-power which keeps us
everlastingly on the go in search of
some unique superiority which will set
us apart from the ordinary run of human
beings
93
Each individual desires to be in control. He seeks to
94
master his environment as far as possible. Each person
90. This paragraph follows Strickland, CN, 1936-1937.
With regard to unconscious problem solving, Brand Blanshard
tells of a friend who arose in the morning to find a geometry
problem solved, in his own handwriting, on the bedside table.
The only plausible explanation is that he got up in his sleep.
Art. (1941), 208.
91. See Bagby, pp, 69-173. Freud regards all conscious
experience as disguised fulfillment of unconscious sexual
wishes of the life-instinct. His thesis is that conscious
life may be entirely explained in terms of unconscious desires
aroused in the past. In this connection Woodworth observes,
"probably, after all, the most important facts to face are
those of the present and future." Conscious wishes are more
relevant to behavior than unconscious. All, 112.
92. GP, 259.
93. So Hocking, to whom the will-to-power is the form
the will to live takes' in man. MS, 309.
94. Woodworth, AM, 9.
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is convinced he is worthy of this. He is "constantly try-
95
ing to maintain or enhance his own feeling of self-regard.
This conviction is a presupposition of all our purposes. It
comes to a focus in the ego-ideal, the accepted pattern of
what a person hopes he may become.
A feeling of unworthine ss results when we measure our-
selves against our ideal, and are found wanting. Rather
than fall short of an ego-ideal, the individual may choose
to endure much hardship and suffering. Thus, for example,
orthodox Jews in concentration camps suffer starvation and
96
death rather than violate religious food restrictions.
Rather than acknowledge a failure to maintain his ideal, a
person will hide his failure from himself by various escape
mechanisms, such as rationalization, projection, compensa-
tion, phantasy, repression, hysteria, amnesia, or fugue, so
97
that he may still be convinced of his worth.
iv. Reality Feeling. A sense of reality is a third
fact involved in the experience of self-consciousness. A
corollary of the development of self-consciousness is a feel-
ing of otherness toward that which is not ego. "...It is
only by comparison with other beings that the ego can be
98
appreciated as a unity different from the rest.
95. Gantril, PSM, 46.
96. Allport, Art. (1940), 540.
97. Cf. Vaughan, 239f., 262. See above, pages 42, 45.
98. Gordon, PER, 264.

56
The individual naturally assumes the reality of this
outside world. As knowledge increases, the idea of reality
changes, so that new ideas may receive the emotional
accreditation of being real. The feeling of reality is
essential to the individual because he is willing to form
purposes and execute plans only if he feels that in so
99
doing he is a real agent in a real world.
The power to accept or reject something as real is an
important factor in self-consciousness. Ideas that are
accepted as real are incorporated within a coherent system
of ideas similarly accredited. The absence of ability to
distinguish between real and unreal is doubt. Extreme and
chronic doubt inhibits action, and frustrates the individual's
sense of worth. So necessary is the feeling of reality that
when a person is unable to make adjustments in the real
world, he escapes from it by hallucination into a self-made
100
world of illusion.
The three facts involved in the experience of self-
consciousness are taken into account in the ego principle.
The individual refers his past experience to his present
purposes within a world he accepts as real. The accepted
world may be objective, or it may be the product of
hallucination. In either case, his self-consciousness has
a sense of reality as its corollary.
99. So Strickland, PRE, 156ff.
100. So Strickland, CN, 1956-1937.
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The purposes of the individual presuppose the desire
of the individual to enhance his value. This fact is in-
cluded in the ego principle.
Likewise, the influence of past experience, with its
implication as to the unity of the individual's mental life,
and its effect, conscious or unconscious, upon the conduct
of the individual, receives recognition in the principle.
v. Some Formal Aspects of the Principle. The ego
principle is formal in three respects: (1) It is ethically
neutral; (2) it is non-committal as to the structure of
personality; and (3) it inplies no particular theory to
account for the unity of mental life. Each of these formal
aspects of the principle will be stated.
In the first place, the principle does not say what is
or what is not an undesirable personality. Whether a person
101
possesses Allport's three marks of maturity, or is a
socially maladjusted intellectual introvert, a sexual pervert
or a megalomaniac, the ego principle applies to him. Within
the framework of the values he regards as real, he associates
his past experience with his present, self-enhancing purposes
Psychology recognizes the fact of value, but, strictly speak-
ing, does not establish any norm of personality. Ethically,
it is neutral.
"101. They are; (1) Losing one's self in the pursuit of
objectives not primarily referred to the self; (2) possessing
the ability to look at one's self objectively; and (3) posses
ing an adequate philosophy of life. PPI, 313-231.
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In the second place, the ego principle states the end
result of the grov/th of personality. It is non-committal
as to the structuration involved in the process of grov/th.
Both Freud's pat picture of super-ego, ego and id, and
McDougall 1 s claim that maturation of innate tendencies
accounts for personality are compatible with the ego princi-
ple. Likewise compatible are William E. Eurnham's emphasis
upon integration, and Allport' s synoptic view, combining
maturation, differentiation and integration as aspects of
growth.
The structuration of personality is admittedly a "new
102
and poorly formulated problem of psychology." Future
formulations may improve and standardize the concepts by
means of which the end-result of personality may be described.
But, as long as there is experience with memory, and purposes
which may be realized as values in a world real to the subject
103
the ego principle will be valid.
vi. Some Positive Implications of the Principle. There
are three positive implications of the ego principle. In the
first place, the ego principle recognizes the fact that the
individual's mental life is a unified process. As Allport
clearly states,
every personality develops continually
102. Allport, PPI, 365.
103. Cf. Brightman's definition of person, Art. (1939),
136f
.
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from the stage of infancy until death,
and through this span it persists even
as it changes .104
In recognizing this fact the ego principle avoids the
"philosophical procedure" of self-psychology, which explains
105
mental processes as an expression of the soul. It pre-
106
supposes no "Substrat des Seelischen." Nor does it lend
support to Ritchie's statement, "the mind is not substance
107
but a process." In short, the nature of the causal basis
of mental life is no concern of scientific psychology. But,
it provides philosophy -with a fact it must reckon with,
namely, that mental life is a unified process.
In the second place, the ego principle iimplies a certain
supremacy of the mental aspect of the individual over his
physiological aspect. A man's character is not in every
case helpless before the ravages of disease or age, or
chemical changes induced by menopause or adolescence, for
example. These "are all handled by the individual in ways
108
characteristic of his own preexisting personality." In
this sense Montague calls the self the captain of its body:
"each of us does truly pilot his body for the normal duration
104. PPI, 95.
105. Moore and Gurnee, PP, 85.
106. Stern, AG, 95; GP, 68.
107. mm, 139.
108. Allport, PPI, 120; cf. 149.
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of the voyage /of life7, urging, checking, and guiding it
109
according to his plans.
There is a third respect in which the mental aspect is
superior to the physiological. The ego principle acknowledges
that the individual can be an effective agency in his environ-
ment. He can make a difference in its course of events, and,
in a measure, control its future. This Gordon calls "the
110
immaterial aspect of personality." This fact, Hocking
maintains, "is the self»s determination of its own degree
111
of being." Mind alone is able to hold together past and
future, fact and value, the actual and the possible. It "is
112
the only organ for making future possibility actual." It
is in this respect, according to Gordon 1 s emergent evolution
point of view, that man helps or hinders God, approaching or
113
receding from the quality of deity.
5. SYSTEMATIZATIOIT OF PSYCHOLOGY
Philosophy of psychology provides a systematization of
psychology. It organizes psychological theory so as to make
philosophical implications explicit, and mutually coherent in
accordance with the point of view of the philosophy of
109. \7T, 96. See above, page 43.
110. PER, 288. Of. Woodworth, AM, 9f., and Hocking,
P6IC, 213.
111.^610, 213.
112. P6IC, 114.
113. PER, 291.
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psychology. The four principles proposed in this chapter
provide the basis for an external systematization of psychol-
ogy. This systematization will be presented. Then the
philosophical issues involved will be stated.
i. The Interrelationships of the Principles. The four
principles proposed in this chapter are mutually complementary.
Each one must involve the others if human conduct is to be
understood psychologically. This fact is exhibited by the
interrelationships of the principles.
Taken by itself, the principle of psycho-physical corre-
lation contributes a little to the understanding of human con-
duct. Responses to what Leonard Carmichael calls "internal
115
environment," which constitute part of the subject matter
of physiological psychology, may be adequately explained by
the principle of psycho-physical correlation. But, instru-
mental behavior, value experience and self-consciousness are
not included within its purview, it is only as psycho-
physical correlation is supplemented by the other principles
that its explanations become significant for the individual as
a whole. Even the biological responses of the infant are
significant for the understanding of human conduct only as
116
they are thought of in terms of future development.
114. See above, page 22.
115. Art. (1941), 19.
116. Cf. Allport, PPI,l29f. Allport starts his structur-ing of the process of mental growth on the level of infantbehavior.

To the fact that human conduct involves psycho-physical
correlation the principle of instrumental behavior adds the
distinction as to what activity is mental, and what is extra-
mental. But, it makes no commitments as to what mental re-
117
active equipment functions for. The principle of value
response and the ego principle supply this lack. Mental
reactive equipment is significant because it functions for
the ego in achieving ego-enhancing value in the social
structure
.
The value response principle places the individual in
his social context. It covers the subject matter of social
psychology. It recognizes that the value of the environment
is relative to his needs and desires. The environment cannot
118
absorb the individual. This recognition assumes that the
individual possesses the mental equipment to interact with
the environment. It presupposes a realizer of value such as
the ego principle describes.
The ego principle takes the facts of self-consciousness
into account. But, self-consciousness cannot exist in a
vacuum. It requires a biological organism, with which it is
correlated. Without social context, and reactive equipment
to deal with the context, self-consciousness could not
119
develop.
117. See above, pages 37f.
118. See above, pages 46f.
119. See above, pages 51, 55f.

The mutually complementary nature of the four princi-
ples, viewed as a whole, defines the scope of psychology.
This scope includes the mental facts which involve, in some
measure, all of the four principles. Since, the principles
do not oermit value judgments to discriminate against mental
120
facts as facts, both normal and abnormal psychology come
within this systematization of psychology. However, not all
facts of mental life are included. Some mental life, such
as that of animals and idiots, does not involve all of the
principles. Animals and idiots do not anticipate the future
121
with conscious purpose, for example. Such cases the proposed
systematization would exclude from the study of the human
individual, and refer to comparative psychology.
This definition of the scope of psychology places no
limits upon investigation. For example, further investi-
gation in physiological psychology will strengthen the
evidence for psycho-physical correlation. Competing theories
as to the way in which mental reactive equipment operates,
and any future synthesis of such theories, are proper to the
principle of instrumental behavior. The same is true in
regard to the structure of motivation and the value response
theory, and the structuring of the process of personality
" 120. See above, pages 49, 57.
121-;"Cf . Flewelling, CP, 286.
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development and the ego principle.
ii. Philosophical Problems . The empirical basis of
philosophy of psychology contains data for three philo-
sophical problems: (1) the mind-body problem; (2) the
problem of value; and (3) the problem of personal identity.
The mind-body problem involves the facts of mental and
bodily processes in their mutual relationships. The problem
is to relate these facts to ultimate reality.
The problem of value has to do with the ultimate nature
of values. Are they merely subjective, or do they possess
some objectivity? Do persons alone create them and preserve
them, or may they exist independently of persons? In short,
what is the status of values in the universe? This problem
involves the psychological data and theory explained by the
principle of value response and the ego principle.
Theories of personal identity propose solutions to the
problem of the status of the individual, in and for himself,
within the universe. The facts of the ego principle are
relevant to this problem.
These problems are dealt with in detail in the next
chapter.
122. See above, pages 31f
.
, 37f
.
, 48f
.
, and 57f.

CHAPTER III
THE EMPIRICAL VALIDITY
OF PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS
The problem of this chapter is to relate the empirical
evidence presented in the previous chapter to philosophical
points of view that are relevant to that evidence. This
relationship is stated in three proposed principles. The
next chapter will "be devoted to the problem of deriving the
interpretative principle of philosophy of psychology from
these principles.
The principles pertain to the philosophical problems the
data of which are contained in the empirical basis of philoso-
phy of psychology. These problems, stated in the previous
chapter, are: (l) the relation of mental life to its physio-
logical correlates, which gives rise to the mind-body problem;
(2) the experience of value, which gives rise to various value
theories; (3) the fact of self-conscious unity, which gives
1
rise to theories of personal identity.
2
In each case, the empirical evidence will be stated.
Then certain philosophical positions will be compared with
the evidence. On the one hand, positions regarded as not
giving proper recognition to the empirical evidence are
1. See above, page 64.
2. The terms, "empirical evidence," and "empirical facts,"
will refer to the empirical basis proposed for philosophy of
psychology in the previous chapter.
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judged to "be empirically invalid. On the other hand, positions
regarded as consistent with the empirical evidence are judged
to be empirically valid. Finally, there is proposed in each
case a principle to relate the empirical evidence and valid
positions.
1. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
i. Empirical Evidence . On the basis of the findings of
3
the previous chapter the following scientific explanation of
the relations of mental and bodily processes is proposed:
Wherever the human organism can deal with environment
other than by direct contact, mental life exists. The
organism reacts to symbols, such as retinal images and
kinetic sensations, as signs of its environment, rather than
directly to the physical objects themselves. The organization
of symbols as a system of stimuli that presupposes a conti-
nuity of experience is mind. Human mind is characterized by the
capacity to anticipate the future with conscious purpose and
to mobilize physical energy, in accordance with past experi-
ence, for the realization of purpose.
In contrast to mind, body consists of all extra-mental
aspects of the organism. The crushed cells of a bruised
finger are body. The pain is mind. The synaptic theory
pertains to body. The decision to get up six o'clock in the
morning is mind. Body is correlated with mind, but body
3. See above, pages 31f
.
,
38ff
. ,
40, 51f
.
,
54f
.
, 62.
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cannot feel or think. On the other hand, it may be
inferred from the facts of psycho-physical correlation
that mind cannot think or feel without body. Mind cannot
occur empirically without body. The appearance of mind,
further, is conditioned by its physical correlate. When
body sleeps, or is in a coma, the organism may be entirely
extra-mental. The injury of certain parts of the body, such
as the cortex, may severely effect mental life. One cortex
may limit mental life to imbecility, another may make genius
possible. In this sense, mind cannot exceed the limitations
of its physical correlate. It is within these limits only
that mind controls body for its own purposes. However,
within these limits mental control means that the physical
event is subsequent to, and caused by, the mental event.
From the above discussion, it may be said that psychology
offers three observations on the relation of mind and body,
(l) Bodily energy is released by mental direction. (2) Body
is extra-mental. As body, it cannot think or feel, whatever
its ultimate metaphysical nature may be. (.3) Mind functions
only with a body, which is a source of experience.
With these observations, the responsibility of psychology
for explaining the facts of mental and bodily process ends.
How these facts are related to ultimate reality is the philo-
sophical mind-body problem. Philosophy of psychology seeks
to interpret psychological data and theory by a philosophi-

cal principle that is empirically valid. Therefore, vari-
ous philosophical positions taken on the mind-body problem
will be presented, and compared with the empirical evidence
adduced above.
ii. Empirically Invalid Positions . According to the
discussion that follows, philosophical positions that assert
either the inefficacy of mind, or the inefficacy of body,
are empirically invalid. That mind is inefficacious is
maintained bv Thomas H. Huxley and John ±s. Watson. On the
other hand, Bernard Bosanquet's and Friedrich Paulsen's
positions, it is argued, do not do justice to the empirical
evidence for the participation of body in personality process.
These positions will be presented in turn.
riuxley's theory, known as epiphenomenalism, and now
4
generally discredited, regards mind as a by-product of
neural processes, having no reciprocal effect upon its cause.
5
Mind is a powerless shadow of body.
This theory stresses the scientific observation that
mind functions only with a body to such an extreme that the
equally scientific observation, that mind directs body, is
excluded. In realizing its purposes, mind causes neural
processes to function. In denying this fact, epiphenomenalism
is empirically invalid.
For philosophical behaviorism, of which Watson is a
4. Cf. Ellis, IS, 236ff.
5. Huxley, EE, 155*. , 141ff.

leading exponent, the physiological activities and their
mental correlates are "both material. Mind is matter. It
is the way the body operates in space. The organism functions
not "by mental direction, but by mechanical responses to
stimuli. Thought is as truly matter in motion as tennis or
swimming. Consciousness is the vocal fiction we call "myself,
6
and which we talk to when deprived of an audience. As
Edgar A. Singer states, "consciousness is not something
7inferred from behavior. It is behavior."
The major scientific criticism of behaviorism is that
it denies that the organism functions by mental direction.
For behaviorism there exists what Bowne calls a "mimicry of
8
thought and feeling" by the body. The body may exhibit
thought-like and feeling-like reactions, but the body cannot
experience feeling or thinking. T&ese are possible only to
the mind. Metaphysically, mind may be a material function.
But the materiality of mind need not invalidate the enroirical
9
distinction between mind and body. And only the philosophi-
cal position that includes the control of the former over
the latter is empirically valid.
Epiphenomenalism and philosophical behaviorism deny that
mind has any efficacy of its own, and on that account they are
empirically invalid. The positions next to be discussed are
those of Bosanquet and Paulsen.
Bosanquet retains the difference between mind and body,
6. Cf. Watson, PSB, lOff
. , 325; US, 97.
7. Art. (1911), 183.
8. MET, 367.
9. Gf. below, pages 72-76.

70
"but .maintains that this difference does not involve any
dualism. The physical system is merely the expression of
a logical system, which is quite competent to complete in
non-spatial activity what was started as "bodily activity.
"The question of duplicating a nuerosis "by a psychosis does
10
not arise." Body exists, not in its own right, but as
"long disciplined and subordinated to a unitary self
11
maintenance.
"
The assertion that body does not exist in its own
right is a metaphysical assertion upon which psychology can
pass no judgment. However, the denial of psycho-physical
correlation as a condition of mental activity contradicts
psychological theory. That mind cannot think or feel without
body may not be a fact of experience, but it is a strongly
12
supported inference used for scientific interpretation.
Since philosophy of psychology can admit only those metaphysi-
cal positions that conform to empirical evidence, Bosanquet's
point of view is for it untenable.
Paulsen holds that mind and body are different substances
that act together in a parallel, non-interacting manner.
Parallelism got its start in Descartes' dichotomy of res
extensa and res cogitans . This view holds that physiological
processes may be explained by mechanical laws, and mental
processes by mental laws. Since both are mutually disparate,
10. VDI, 3; Cf. 1-5.
11. PIV, 203.
12. See above, pages 31f.
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the causal activity of neither effects the other; yet there
exists a concomitance between the two. On this view, either
the world is split in two, and the coordinate activity is "a
13
miracle on the grandest scale," or one member of the dualism
accounts for the coincidence of activity. Paulsen's position
illustrates one possibility of the second alternative.
Paulsen' s parallelism grants the applicability of physi-
cal laws within the physical sequence, but safeguards the
interests of mind by regarding body as "a one-sided view of
existence," an appearance t hat is "an inadequate representation
14
of existence in our sensibility." Such a view, observes
James B. Pratt, strips the physical of causal efficiency.
"Each link in the chain of physical appearance is pulled
along not by the preceding physical link but by the preceding
15
psychic link," despite Paulsen's protest that "the physical
16
processes in the brain form a closed causal nexus."
For Paulsen, mind directs body, which is extra-mental;
but body is allowed no reciprocal influence upon mind. There
is a point to point correspondence of mental and bodily
activity, but the activity of body is exclusively the result
of the activity of mind. Body is not regarded as a source of
experience. However adequate parallelism may be as a solution
13. Laird, MD, 101.
14. IP, 110, HI-
15. MS, 71.
16. IP, 84.
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17
of the relation of mechanical sequence and mental events,
if it does not take the scientific evidence into account it
is inadequate for philosophy of psychology.
iii. Empirically Valid Positions . The philosophical
positions of which empirical validity is asserted are divided,
for purposes of exposition, into two groups. The positions
of Montague, C. Lloyd Morgan, and Roy Sellars are regarded
as qualitatively monistic. By qualitative monism is meant
that mind and "body, although empirically distinguishable,
belong to the same order of reality. Mind and body are
empirically different, but metaphysically of the same quality.
The positions of Pratt and Brightman represent qualitative
dualism. Qualitative dualism means that the empirical dis-
tinction between mind and body is also a metaphysical dis-
tinction. Mind and body belong to different orders of reality.
18
Metaphysically, they are of different quality. First, the
qualitatively monistic positions will be discussed.
Montague proposes physical energy as the least common
denominator of mind and body. Mental energy is called anergy
when it accumlates at a synapse, and there turns from an
afferent neural impulse into an efferent. Anergy is potential
mental energy, and is felt as consciousness. Rational
reflection potentializes more energy than habit, for example,
17. Cf. Pratt, iuS, 74: "To suppose that Parallelism is
bp.sed on the empirical discoveries of physiological psychology
is completely to misunderstand the situation. Parallelism is
based ... on the theory ... that mechanical laws are universal."
18. According to this classification, the positions of
Huxley, Watson and Bosanquet are qualitative monisms, and that
of Paulsen a qualitative dualism.
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and so involves a greater intensity of consciousness. Mind and
non-mind, including body, are energy. But energy is not
drab "dead matter." It is rich with psychic qualities —
color, taste, love, envy, — all of the unexhaustible nuances
of mental life. Nevertheless, material things possess an
autonomy that threatens values. This threat appears to be
lessened by the activity of a finite God, who modifies materi-
ality in favor of values.
Values may be realized because, v/hile anergy brings mind
into physical continuity with matter and its mechanical laws,
mind and its purposive laws remain intact. When mind "has
power to use the body and its environment as a means to the
fulfillment and development of its ideals" it has become spirit
Res cogitans , "instead of being hopelessly alien to the
material world" is "a field of potential energies within the
world," functioning "as spiritual substance ... within the
20
larger res extensa . " The mind grows in the body as a plant
21
grows in the soil.
Montague calls his position ultra-materialism. Materi-
alism is carried to the extreme of pan-Tosychism, for physical
energy possesses psychic qualities. Mind and body are both
constituted by this energy. Upon the validity of this meta-
physical contention psychology can pass no judgment. But,
19.- BU, 79.
20. WT, 509.
21. Cf. Williams: "The fact that a man's soul is caused
by physical things does not deprive it of its essential spirit-
uality." Art. (1941), 708. The exposition of Montague's po-
sition is from WT, 467-510, 93-109, 544; CSD, 90, 92; BU," 76-84
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the distinction Montague recognizes between mind and body
is empirically valid. Mind uses body to serve its purposes.
Purposive laws of mind determine the amount of anergy and its
direction. Mind has causal efficiency. On the other hand,
consciousness is physically conditioned. Mind functions, under
empirical circumstances, only with a body, which is a source
of experience. On the basis of these considerations it may
be asserted that Montague's position is empirically valid.
According to Morgan, all existence has a psychical and
a physical side. In the evolutionary process, which Morgan
viewi frankly as materialistic, psychic and Dhysical attri-
22
butes emerge together in "unrestricted correlation." How-
ever, as Charles M. Morris observes, "Morgan is anxious to
23
make mind causally effective." Hence, evolutionary ascent
is measured by the increasing dominance of mind over body.
The advent of life, mind, and reflective thought are emergents
marking this increase. The existence of ideals is a precursor
of deity, the next level of emergence. However, in viewing
the relation of mind and body, Morgan shares S. Alexander's
"natural piety." Mind and body intra-act as the functioning
of the material evolutionary process. The "acknowledgment"
of G-od as the "Creative Source of evolution" is not invoked
24
to explain the mind-body relationship.
Morgan's emergent evolution asserts a qualitative
22. EE, 116.
23. STM, 239, n. 2.
24. EE, 89. This exposition of Morgan's position follows
EE, 1-9; 33, 26, 61, 67, 194, 204, 208f
. ,
282/298. Morgan
acknowledges Spinoza's influence. However, Spinoza regarded
thought and extension as parallel attributes of substance, where-
as for Morgan, either may ta ke precedence over the other. Cf
.
Spinoza, ETH, Part II, Prop. 7; Wild, SEL, 149-
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continuity of all existence. Various emergents differ
according to the relationship that obtains between their
psychic and physical components. But these components are
unified within material process. Qualitatively, mind and
"body of the idealizing human person are material, materi-
ality "being at once panpsychic and panphysical. However,
Morgan's view admits the psychological distinction "between
mind and "body. On the personal level, the mental component
controls the physical for the realization of ideals. But,
there can "be no mental life without its physical counterpart.
It is their concurrent emergence that the evolutionary process
literally materializes. The common materiality of mind and
"body justifies classifying Morgan's position as qualitatively
monistic, and the recognition of the scientific evidence bear-
ing on the mind-body relationship empirically validates his
point of view.
Roy Sellars rejects as nonsense the view that "the motion
25
of atoms is consciousness." Rather, consciousness "assists
26
the brain to solve problems." However, he cautions that as
soon as psychical entities "are given by themselves power to
do things, they become to the deceived thinker non-physical
27
and ^lien to physical reality." Evolution "implies a
change in the mode of activity of parts of nature," and nhvsi-
28
cal consciousness is such a change. The mental has emerged
25. EP, 260.
26. Art. (1918), 158.
27. EN, 317.
28. CR, 235. The passages quoted are cited in Pratt,
MS, 36-46. Cf. EN, 299-302.
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from the non-mental, but in its emergence it has not lost
its qualitative oneness with the non-mental. As Maurice D.
Allen observes, for Sellars "our ideas are naturally caused
like breathing or any other function, and ... they participate
29
in the energizing of human behavior."
Sellars distinguishes between mind and body, but
regards mind as a physical function of the organism. Mind
and body are both physical. In their metaphysical quality
they are alike. This position is consistent with the empiri-
cal evidence of psychology, for Sellars asserts the efficiency
of mind to "do things," and warns that no independence of its
physical matrix is to be inferred from this efficiency. The
warning is metaphysical, but the recognition of the bodily
relationship of mind is scientific. In view of its consistency
with psychological evidence, it may be asserted that Sellars'
position is empirically valid.
Interact ionist theories are qualitative dualisms. Mind
and body are accepted as qualitatively distinct from each
other, and yet as mutually influencing each other. Certain
mind events are followed by certain bodily events. Conversely,
certain bodily events are followed by certain mind events.
On the one hand, mind and its processes are dependent upon
the body in two empirical ways: Mind cannot exist without body,
and bodily processes are causes of mental events. On the
other hand, body is controllable by, and instrumental to, the
29. Art. (1942), 646.
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30
purposes of mind.
The reciprocal influence of mind and body, two unlike
entities with respect to quality, may "be thought of as due
to their interaction. According to Bowne, this concept may
be accepted as being the sole explanation of the union of
mind and body. Or, the concept itself may be interpreted by
subordinating mind and body within a metaphysical system which
31
is the ground of their interaction. Pratt's position
illustrates the first alternative. Pratt accepts the concept
that interaction tskes -olace as a sufficient explanation of
the reciprocal effects of mind and body upon each other. A
Monism of Interaction accounts for the reciprocal action of
32
qualitatively different mind and body. Brightman, following
Bowne, accepts the second alternative. Beth mind and body
are dependent upon God; thus a common ground within which
33
interaction takes place is provided. What empirically is
interaction metaphysically becomes intra-action.
Interaction is consistent with the empirical evidence of
the relation of mind and body. For Pratt's realism, this evi-
dence is accepted as supporting the principle of Monism of
Interaction, which saves qualitative dualism of mind and body
from being mere parallelism. Brightman' s doctrine of divine
immanence is likewise valid. Mind directs body, which is
empirically extra-mental, even though it may metaphysically
30. Pratt, MS, 137f
. ,
147-148, 164f., 186, 177. Bright-
man, Art. (1939), 133, and references in note 33.
31. MET, 351, 354.
32. MS, 191f., 215.
33. Brightman, ITP, 205, 210, 287f
.
, 341f
.
; cf. Knudson,
PP, 232f., Bowne, MET, 250-255.

be dependent upon divine mind. And, whatever existence it
may have by virtue of its metaphysical status, empirically
l s
mind functions only with a body, which^a source of experience.
iv. The Principle of Self-Determinism . Prom the above
comparisons of empirical evidence and philosophical positions
it may be said that positions asserting either the inefficacy
of mind, such as those of Huxley and Watson, or the inefficacy
of body, such as those of Bosanquet and Paulsen, are empiri-
cally invalid. Hence, the empirically derived interpretative
principle of philosophy of psychology cannot be constructed
on their basis. Positions that properly take the empirical
evidence into account include those of Montague, Morgan,
Sellars, Pratt and Brightman. The following principle is
proposed to relate the empirical evidence and these empirically
vplid positions:
Bodily processes influence and condition, and are instru-
mental to, self-determined mental processes.
This principle of self-determination recognizes the
empirical distinction between mental and bodily processes.
It acknowledges that body is subject to mental direction on
the one hand, and that mind functions only with a body, and
is subject to bodily influence, on the other. It stands
•betweem
;
pre-determinism and indeterminism. Pre determinism
means that the individual's actions are necessary reactions
that take place only within a cause-effect series. The fact

that the individual is able to realize his own purposes "by
using as an instrument the "body, the processes of which may
"be described within a cause-effect series, refutes pre-
determinism. However, the fact that purposeful activity is
limited by the properties of the bodily instrument and the
past experience of mind, makes it necessary to take a determin-
istic factor into account in formulating into a principle the
facts of mind-body correlation. This necessity refutes
inde termini sm, which means that the individual's activity
constitutes events that bear no necessary connection to any
other events. The principle of self-determinism takes into
account the fact that individuals in their activity are
determined by mental effects of bodily processes as they
work out their purposes by the mental mobilizing of physical
resources. Standing midway between predeterminism and
indeterminism, self-determinism adequately accounts for the
34
reciprocal influence of mind and body upon each other.
Philosophically, the principle of self-determinism is
compatible with the empirically valid positions presented
above. Montague's concept of anergy illustrates for his
position the influence and instrumentality of bodily processes
for mind. The intensity of consciousness is correlated with
the duration of potentiality, and mind directs anergy for its
34. Douglas C. Macintosh makes a similar distinction.
The concept of self-determinism stands between
_
predeterminism
and indeterminism as an adequate rationalization of the moral
imfcuition of responsibility. Art. (1940), 50. Cf. Williams:
"External forces produce a man's soul, and his soul (or self
or personality), under fortunate circumstances, produces a
good life. True freedom is self-determinism." Art. (1941),
709; cf. 705.
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for its purposes. 3elf-determinism "by ideals, an approach
to the quality of deity, is for Morgan the highest emergent
in the psycho-physical evolutionary process. Sellars regards
mind as part of the body that has "power to do things."
Interactionism accepts as evidence for its metaphysical
points of view the fact that "body is controllable by, and
instrumental to, the purposes of mind, to which it is indis-
pensable .
However, the principle of self-determinism, as applied
to the mind-body problem, makes no committments as to the
nature of the agency or process or substance that unifies
mind and body. As far as the principle of self-determinism
is concerned, ultra-material energy (Montague), materialistic
evolutionary process (Morgan), physical reality (Sellars), a
monism of interaction (Pratt), or divine immanence (Brightman),
may or may not be adequate explanations of the ultimate nature
of the mind-body relation. As Paul Crissman points out in
his empirical definition of freedom, self-determinism may be
35
part of a system of natural determinism. Hans Driesch
states that if we discover freedom of willing, it would be
no more than an index of the r$le we have to play, in a
36
determined way, in a superpersonal Whole. Choice may, as
Blanshard believes, be dominated by the implicit end of
35. When events that are desired occur in the causal
nexus, freedom exists. Art. (1942), 525. Cf. Williams, Art.
(1942).
36. P6IC, 7f.
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thought, namely, to leave no loose ends. On the other
hand, as Knudson maintains, the power of man to decide for
himself what course he shall take may point to a spiritual
38
world view in which freedom is metaphvsically grounded.
While the principle of self-determinism in itself is
not competent to deal with these metaphysical considerations,
it does make the empirical facts concerning the relation of
mind and body philosophically relevant.
2. VALUE THEORIES
This division of the chapter will discuss several
theories of value, and point out their consistency or their
inconsistency with the empirical facts of value experience.
Then a principle to formulate the facts as they relate to
positions consistent with them will he proposed.
i. Empirical Evidence . On the basis of the findings of
39
the previous chapter the following scientific explanation
of the experience of value is proposed:
When desires are satisfied and needs are met, values are
realized. The idea symbolizing the desires and needs is an
ideal. In value realization the person acts on his ideal so
as to control his inner life and his environment for its
achievement. The fact of ideal motivation is central in the
empirical evidence of value experience. Value experience can-
37. Art. (1941), 215f.; cf. 209ff.
38. DR, 123, 127.
39. See above, pages 40-60.

not be had unless the subject reaches beyond what is, to
what he considers ought to be, to satisfy his needs and
desires. These needs and desires are self-enhancing. He
identifies them with the past-inclusive unity which he calls
self, and he assumes that in satisfying them he is a real
agent in a real world. Hence, ideal motivation presupposes
self-conscious personal unity.
However, value experience is not merely a subjective
affair. The meeting of needs and the satisfaction of desires
depend upon two social conditions, namely, social approval
and social resistance. These two social conditions objecti-
fy the value experience. Individualized values must be social-
ized values.
From these observations it follows that the content of
value experience is always socially relevant to the self-
conscious purposes of the individual. Values are individual
creations with social content.
These conclusions as to the nature of value are as far
as psychological explanation may go. The metaphysical status
of values is the problem of philosophical theories of value.
Are values merely subjective, or do they possess some
objectivity? Do persons alone create values and preserve them,
and if so, is God to be included among the persons? May
values exist independently of persons?
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These questions are considered, in the expositions of
the various value theories in the two following sections.
On the one hand, it is argued that the positions of Albert P.
Weiss, Edwin G-. Spaulding, and Edward S. Ames are not
consistent with the empirical evidence of value experience.
Hence, with reference to the problem of deriving an interpre-
tative principle from psychological data and theory, they
are empirically invalid. On the other hand, it is argued
that the positions of Ralph B, Perry, Henry N. Wieman, and
William R. Sorley are empirically valid in this respect.
These positions will be presented in turn.
ii. Empirically Invalid Positions . According to Weiss,
"all value is acquired as a series of habits and activities
from the social organization in which the individual develops."
There is no need to invoke any "evaluating" process to explain
values. The achievement of values is merely sensorimotor
behavior of the individual in the presence of (certain stimulu-
lating factors. Knowing what these are, and the organic
inheritance of the individual, the value situation can be
accounted for. Value responses differ from other responses
because there is a delay in final response, due to many
alternative stimuli. To facilitate selection of socially
approved stimuli, certain correct responses have been verbally
classified; e.g., "honesty is the best policy." Proper train-
ing in response to socially approved stimuli will eliminate
40. Art. (1932), 122.
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the experience of value.
However effective a social norm may "be pragmatically,
values are completely relative to the civilization to which
they "belong. There is no such thing as a fundamental value.
Objectively, human behavior and animal behavior have the
same non-moral quality. "The term 'better' is a human
category and would not be present if there were no human
41
beings." From this point of view, conditions conducive
to survival and variability of behavior are classified as
42
valuable. There is no such thing as inherent value.
Psychologically, Weiss explains value in terms of
stimulus-response sequence. Since the stimuli are social,
this view recognizes that values are socially relevant. But,
Weiss' explanation does not account for the empirical fact
that value experience is possible only as the subject reaches
beyond what is to what he considers ought to be. This self-
directional activity must, of course, meet social conditions.
But, it is more than a delayed response to external stimuli.
It is a deliberate attempt to control inner life and environ-
ment in the interests of its approved purposes. Sensorimotor
behavior and the social matrix serve as the instruments and
ground of value achievement, rather than the source of value
experience. The source of value experience is the value process,
by means of which future possibility, resident in present
41. Art. (1932), 114.
42. The exposition of Weiss' r»osition is based on Art.
(1932).
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purposes, is made actual.
The universe may "be non-moral, and Weiss may be
correct metaphysically in his rejection of inherent value.
Upon this issue psychology remains silent. However, the
psychological foundations of his theory are subject to psycho-
logical scrutiny, and in this respect his theory is
inconsistent with the empirical evidence. This empirical
inadequacy disqualifies Weiss' position from consideration
in the construction of the interpretative principle of phi-
losophy of psychology.
43
According to Spaulding's "neo-realism of ideals,"
discover ideals which are timeless. They are independent
of our consciousness of them, and of the requirements of our
physiological organism. We may permit them to move in on us
and possess us. We then "have ideals" at +v>e command of which
"we go counter to the desires and inroulses that are causally
44
and instinctively related to human nature." Creativity and
purpose in the physical world process are due to value residing
in it as efficient cause. Values are part of "the very structure
45
of reality itself." The values that subsist unrealized in
the world process, and the values that exist in persons, are
in their totality identified with God. God is not personal
in the usual sense. He represents the life of the universe,
and so conserves values and originates them.
43. NaR, vi.
44. NaR, 395. Italics mine.
45. NaR, 506.
J 46. Cf. NaR, 497f . , 69, 507, 395, 517. This expositionis indebted to Brightman's organization of the material in
SPT, 29-55.
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Spaulding recognizes a certain subjective aspect
of values since they may exist in persons. But, they are
not the product of personal purpose. In realizing values,
the person translates into existence an ideal that subsists
independently within the nature of the universe. Whether
any person, human or divine, were ever motivated by it or
not, it would still be real in its own right. The existence
of such values cannot be gainsaid by psychology. However,
on the other hand, the extra-mental objectivity of values
has no empirical basis. For Spaulding, whatever subjective
qualities values have is deduced from their objectivity. It
is not based upon the value process. This lack of psycho-
logical foundation makes Spaulding' s theory irrelevant to the
task of philosophy of psychology, namely, the construction of
an empirically derived interpretative principle.
In Ames 1 theory values belong within an extra-mental
social process, but they reside as Dublic property in individu-
als. Social process is more real than the individuals that
constitute it. The self is public. It is made up of
meanings, purposes, and imaginative ideas which may be shared
and simultaneously possessed by any number of persons. The
larger the social wholes the person becomes a part of, the
more real he becomes. The need to maintain social connection,
and not mere animal preservation, is the great spring of
human action. The most inclusive social connection is God.
God consists of all socially approved values. His corpo-
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ate existence has a spirit as very much its own as Alma
Mater or Uncle Sam. The term God "expresses order and
purposes and moral values in the great Reality which we call
life or the world," and it includes "man and all the processes
47
of an aspiring social life." Religious values change v/ith
economic and cultural changes, "but this does not effect the
reality of God. Since ideals emanate from the human social
process, and hence are natural, and as real as rock, God, who
symbolizes them, is likewise real. God is reality idealized.
The penalty of failure to share in this idealization "by
refusing to "become a carrier of social value is that the "self
48
becomes unreal and its efforts appear futile and illusory."
Thus, for Ames the reality of God and the reality of man go
49
together.
Ames emphasizes the social content of values at the
expense of their individual creation. It is true, as the
principle of value response recognizes, that there are social
conditions for having value experience. The social milieu is
indispensable to selfhood. Personal qualities are in a large
measure what your group elicits from you. Society objecti-
fies value. Groups are real. We are born into them and we
sustain them by sharing things and ideas. They are part of
our experience, and so we feel they have a right to live.
The fallacy of Ames is that he makes the individual self a
47. REL, 178, 177.
48. REL, 146-147.
49. Cf. REL, 141, 131-135; 141ff
. ,
151, 168, 170, 177.
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product of the group rather than the group an expression of
the self. Groups are a condition of individual value experience,
but they do not have primary reality. Groups exist only as
50
they are experienced by the individuals composing them. Thus,
individuals ^ive reality to the group. Objectively, values
may have the same kind of existence a common noun has. Prom
a psychological point of view no judgment may be passed upon
this assertion. However, the exaggeration of the social con-
dition of the value process at the expense of ideal motivation
is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. value experience
is socially conditioned, but the fact remains that it is by
ideal motivation that values are initiated. In minimizing this
fact Ames' position is empirically invalid.
With respect to the positions of Weiss, Spaulding, and
Ames the conclusion has been reached that they are empirically
invalid. The opposite conclusion is reached with respect to
the positions of Perry, Wieman and Sorley. The reasoning
justifying this conclusion follows.
iii. Empirically Valid Positions . Perry regards values
51
as "functions of certain actions of living mind." These
functions manifest a constant feature, which is their origi-
nal source. This feature is interest. "That which is an
52
object of interest is eo ipso invested with value." Where
interests conflict, "the maximum fulfillment of both interests
50. Of. x^rightman, PI, 128.
51. G?TV, 139. Cf. NR, 140.
52. STY, 115. of. PPT, 333.
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53
which conditions allow" is "moral purpose. " The highest
54
good is an "all-benevolent" will. Interest invests its
object with value, and in this consists the objectivity of
value. It is absolute and objective as fact. Of value
judgments, Perry states that "propositions concerning value
may hold at all times, and even for all times, and yet be
55
metaphysically insignificant." Thus, justice may conduce to
abundant living, but this does not maintain justice. The latter
may come, however, by moral causality. "Steadiness of purpose
is no less, and no more, a matter of fact than conservation of
56
energy." Human agency may intervene in the causal chain, and
57
"through altering the cause predetermine the effect." Organism
may act on the environment, and enable the environment to act
on it, and terminate such action. Man is free in an environ-
ment that is indifferent to what he wants or chooses. The
58
"being of things is not grounded in their goodness." It is
entirely conceivable that there may be a margin of evil over
59
good, or no good at all. Realism "exnlicitly repudiates every
60
spiritual or moral ontology." Existence is "more fundamental
61
than value," and "independent of it." Value is a relation
that exists between organism and things when the former is
62
"interested" in the latter. Moral idealism is the struggle
to extend this relation by investing the indifference of
53. ME, 53, 54. Perry's italics omitted.
54. G-TV, 687.
55. PPT, 340. Cf. NR, 148.
56. PPT, 341.
57. G-TV, 522.
58. PPT, 344.
59. G-TV, 625.
60. PPT; 344.
61. G-TV, 26.
62. GTV, 116.

environment with value. Moral idealism expects that "the
63
world shall become good through the elimination of evil."
God is the ideal that all existence be invested with value.
The world becomes divine through being
willed to be divine, and hence its
being divine is conditioned by the
dynamic faith through which high resolves
are carried into effect. God's ex-
istence may in this sense result from a
belief in God, though no^.from a belief
that God already exists.
Perry bases his philosophy of moral idealism upon the
psychological fact that in value realization the person,
acting on the basis of his wants and choices, can exercise
some control over his relationship to environment. "Moral
causality" is equivalent to value process. Further, value
has an objective reference. This objective reference Perry
acknowledges in his relational theory of value. Moreover,
values are socially relevant. The 'universe becomes friendly
to human interest, and God exists, in the measure that "all-
benevolent" will prevails.
Whether Perry rightly denies metaphysical significance
to value judgments cannot be decided on psychological grounds.
But, in making this denial, and in asserting the relational
theory of value, and the doctrine of moral idealism, Perry
takes the evidence of value experience into account. Therefore
Perry's position is empirically valid with reference to the
task of philosophy of psychology.
63. ME, 249.
64. GTV, 689.
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For Wieman, as for Ames, the self is a social product.
animals are non-social because they are exclusive in their
use of good and in their devotion. From this non-social
condition men developed until they could communicate. These
two orders, the order of animal existence and the order of
communication, are in conflict. We are dual creatures, for
we belong to both. The principal exhortation in The Issues
of Life is an appeal to undergo suffering that the order of
communication —
in which and through which men can
achieve a communal vision and a united
good in which each individual finds in
all his living the meaning andj-the value
of the whole march of life —
might be victorious over the animal order. G-od is the
possibility of the reconciliation of the animal order and
the order of communication, and the actuality of whatever
reconciliation has been consummated. The interaction and
progressive integration of sunshine, biological processes
^nd .social heritage suggest what God is like. It is within
66
this realm of discourse that ideals may be actualized.
The human instrument for actualizing the possible is
personality. "Personality is that which communicates and
67
hence which shares experience." Only in the sense that the
order that is G-od includes persons in its reconciliation is
God personal. God is the ideal toward which the personality
STTTL, 175.
66. IL, 173, 216, 212, 135, 178, 164f
.
, 221f.
67. IL, 209; cf. 219.
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process moves, and thus he sustains personality. ±5ut,
U-od is of intrinsic value, and personality is instrumental.
When our personalities are good instruments, the ideal
possibilities of God become actualized, and "the world leaps
68
forward toward the highest value."
For Wieman, the individual is more than a mere receptor
of social value. The realization of the ideal of the order
of communication is made a matter of individual initiative.
The exhortation to enrich the order of communication is
empirically based on the fact that value experience cannot
be realized unless we act on what we consider ought to be.
±>y his altruism the individual may increase the quality of
social value, lifting himself and his fellow men above the
animal order of existence.
Wieman makes the reality of the social ideal the ground
of the objectivity of value. For Ames, values are merely
social process. Wieman goes beyond this to postulate an
ideal order of nature fulfilling itself in a complete integration
of physical, biological, and value factors. This natural
fulfillment is impersonal, although it includes the personality
process by means of which its fulfillment is attained. To
speak of a value-order that partly exists now, and partly is
in the realm of possibility, as the ground that inspires its
own actualization is to give both to realized values and
possible values, or ideals, a metaphysical status. Subjectively,
68. IL, 225. Cf. 229, 220.
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personality is the instrument that causes the actualization
69
of values. Objectively, God is the impersonal value-
conserving process. As the order of communication he receives
the values that have "been realized through the instrumentality
of personality. Values are personally produced by finite
individuals, and impersonally conserved "by superpersonal
Creative Interaction.
The criticism of the metaphysical status of value is not
within the province of psychology. Values may "be personally
created and impersonally preserved, as Wieman maintains. How-
ever, in arguing for his position, Wieman accepts the empirical
evidence of value experience. He regards the content of value
experience as socially relevant, and the motivation of value
experience as relevant to the self-conscious purposes of the
individual. Herein his position is psychologically sound.
Sorley regards value as the product of personal purpose,
human and divine. In brief, his moral argument for the
existence of God is: (l) values can exist only in minds; (2)
values are objective to persons; (3) therefore, objective
value, to exist in mind, must exist in divine mind. Sorley
base., his argument upon the following considerations:
The worth of a man as a rational being comes as he lifts
himself above cause and effect, and meets circumstances by
principle. This value response varies with age and intellectual
condition, but in every case it presumes upon the possibility
69. Since Wieman regards value as being the creation of
individuals, viewing personality as an instrument does not in-
validate his theory from the point of view of the evidence of
value experience. For a discussion of the empirical validity
of personality as a means to an ulterior end, see below, pagel09ff.
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of actualizing what the person considers ought to be. By
the assumption of value, we pass from "ought" to "is." Moral
agents are causal agents, and no value judgments exist outside
of them.
However, each individual mind depends upon the minds of
70
others. "Personality itself is a social category." Thus,
values vary with social conditions. However, rather than
indicating the mere subjectivity of values, this variance
points to their objectivity. Differing circumstances account
for difference in judgment, and here we go beyond the subject
to certain relationships among the objects. It is because
of the value we see in these relationships that we claim
validity for our moral judgments. Further, any moral judgment
to be valid must be consistent with all other moral judgments.
There is a connectedness and organic wholeness about values.
The moral demand to harmonize the actual with the ideal gives
to the entire system of values an objective existence apart
from any particular realization of value within it. Finally,
the fact that the concrete person who realizes value is part
of objective reality is another argument for the objectivity
of values. "At least one part of the universe does as a
71
matter of fact perform the role of producer of values."
The moral agent is a causal agent. A part of his reality is
his striving to realize values. And since values are needed
for the completion of a person, they belong to the order of
To: kTIG, 130.
71. MVIG, 241.
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the .universe. Thus, they "both satisfy the person and yet
are valid independently of him. "In this way they belong
72
to the sum total of reality as an existing system."
The last reason offered for the objectivity of values
is the gist of Sorley's argument. The physical world and
the world of value come together in one person. Here are
different aspects of the same reality united in the personal
situation. Values, known by appreciation, and physical
phenomena, known by perception, are equally real within the
self-conscious subject. Yet both are objective to the subject.
Sorley concludes that their objective nature, which exists
independently of any appreciation or perception of it, must
be subjectively grounded in the mind of God. "The idea of
goodnes.s does not exist in finite minds or in their material
73
environments;" it belongs to the Supreme Mind. Man and
nature are fulfilling the purpose of this Supreme Mind.
The position of values in the universe is outside the
psychological realm of discourse. However, the empirical
status assigned to values as part of their metaphysical
significance may be criticized from a psychological point of
view. From this standpoint it may be said that Sorley's
argument takes the empirical evidence into account. On the
assumption of the possibility of their actualization persons
produce values in social circumstances. Sorley acknowledges
the fact that value experience is always socially relevant
72. MVIG, 241.
73. MVIG, 352. Cf. 182-206; 466. Brightman describes
Sorley's argument as "the most satisfactory argument for the
objectivity of moral values and the dependence of all value
upon personality that I have seen." PI, 211.
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and always relevant to the self-conscious purposes of
individuals. Since values are created only "by persons, he
concludes that they can exist only in minds. Since values
are realized on the assumption that what ought to be, can "be,
all possible moral judgments constitute an objective reference
to the subject. The social circumstances in which value is
realized provide another objective reference. The final
argument for objectivity, that the performer of values is
part of the real universe, and hence the values he achieves
share in reality, is consistent with the empirical fact of
reality feeling involved in self-consciousness.
iv. The Principle of Value Process . From the above compari-
son of empirical evidence and philosophical positions it may
be said that certain value theories are empirically invalid,
at least in the sense that they are irrelevant to the empirical
derivation of the interpretative principle of philosophy. These
theories include those that: (l) deny personally initiated
achievement of value (Weiss); (2) do not use an empirical
basis (Spaulding); and (3) underestimate personal initiative in
the value process and exaggerate the social relevance of
values (Ames).
On the other hand, positions properly taking the empiri-
cal evidence into account include those of Perry, Wieman, and
Sorley. These positions agree that the individual is a
causal agent. The values he realizes make a difference in
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external affairs. All agree that values have an objective
reference. For Perry, the objective reference which human
"interest" invests with value is an indifferent universe.
For Wienian and Sorley, striving for value and achievement
of value belong to the order of the universe. Wieman
regards the ultimate objectivity of value as impersonal.-
Sorley regards it as personal. All agree that values give
meaning to life. The following principle is proposed to
relate these empirically valid philosophical interpretations
of value and the empirical evidence of value experience:
The value process is a function of personal purpose,
and exists objectively.
The term "value process" is sufficiently broad to
include the motivating ideal, the striving for its fulfill-
ment, and the end-result of that striving.
The term "function of personal purpose" emphasizes the
causal nature of the value process. The value process
asserts that personal purposes are valid for objective
existence. This assertion overcomes in a measure the incompe-
tence of the principle of self-determination to decide the
metaphysical significance of the abilitv of the person to
74
realize his own purposes. But this decision must be free
from the "concealed premise" which assumes, in the words of
John Laird, that "what is central in us must be held to be
central in our world, and what is central in our world must
74. See above, page 80.
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75
be central in the world .
"
Thus, from the data of ourselves as willing and
struggling, we cannot, merely on the empirical evidence
supporting the principle of value process, accept with
Knudson "our own conscious personal agency as the key to the
76
ultimate meaning of the causal category." On the other hand,
it is precisely this kind of causation, which Knudson calls
volitional, that is consistent with the principle of value
process. Causation in which every event is the consequent
of a past event and the antecedent of a future event would
predetermine every action of the individual. Since the cause-
effect sequence is instrumental to personal purpose, there
is at least one part of the universe that is bejrond mechanical
causation. Further, causation as a logical deduction from the
system of the Absolute, or from the essence of an event,
leaves no room for creative activity in the value process.
In value achievement, the person reaches beyond what is to
what he considers ought to be. This fact logical causality
77
and mechanical determinism find intractable. Whatever the
ultimate nature of causality may be, it must recognize the
reality of the causality of the value process. This fact
permits, but it does not require, volition to be grounded in
a personal deity.
By the "objective existence" of value process is meant
75. MD, 217; cf. 218.
76. PP, 221.
77. Cf. Knudson, PP, 210-225.
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the. respects in which it is other than a mere subective
experience. Values are more than a "subjective addendum
78
to reality" in at least four respects
In the first place, an ideal as a plan of action is
in a great measure predetermined "by previous choices.
Ideals do not exist separately. They belong to a system
which each person gradually builds up, and which he
acknowledges as a whole. This system has a conceptual
existence, which, in serving as a criterion of choice, is
objective to the selection of any particular ideal as a plan
of action. And the particular ideal selected as the person s
good is a unified structure composed of many approved partial
goods of the acknowledged system. "The unity of that good is
79
the objective counterpart of the unity of the self ... ."
Thus, the selected ideal, and the system with which it is
connected, have a conceptual existence that is objective to
personal purpose.
In the second place, the system of ideals has a social
relevance. We are born into a world of value patterns not
our own making. We assimilate our social norms, and we
never can be so critical of them as to remove ourselves from
their realm of discourse. The ideals we construct are made
of the social fabric, ana the values we realize are woven
into the social fabric again. Value experience is socially
relevant. The social conditions for value experience give
78. urban, P6IC, 292. The decision as to whether values
are merely subjective, or objective as well, urban calls
"a Great Divide in modern value theory." 292.
79. Hocking, P6IC, 212.
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objective significance to the value process. We refer to
social relationships in claiming validity for our value
judgments. At least the value process exists with as great
reality as the social process.
In the third place, the valuer is more real than the
criterion of value which exists by his conception, and the
social process which gives rise to and receives his values.
"One can," declares docking, "doubt the value of everything
in the universe excent the valuer, for with his disappearance
80
the whole world of values collapses." The content of
value experience may be socially derived, but the creation
of value and the sustenance of social process depends upon the
individual. The value process is at least, as valid for
objective reality as the valuer is objectively real. This
leads to a final consideration.
In the fourth place, value process is the function of
personal purpose. In realizing value, the individual is an
agent who makes a difference in external affairs. In
satisfying his self-enhancing needs and desires, the world is
changed. Block-busters and babies, beer trucks and blood
banks, are manifestations of personal purpose. In value
realization inner life and outer environment are controlled
by ideal motivation. In realizing values, the individual is
at least as real as the causal function he -performs. To
81
that extent, the value process has an objective existence.
80. TDL, 252; cf. 9.
81. For the empirical basis of these four respects, cf.
above, pages 40-46, 60, 81f.
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It does not follow that because value process has
objective existence its place in objective reality may be
defined. The principle of value process is pertinent to the
nature of objective reality, but its implications are by no
means conclusive. Existence and value are correlated, but is
this correlation to be explained as indicating a reality
that is neither mental nor material, as Wilbur M. Urban
82
maintains? Is volitional causality merely the means for
establishing a "unity of social intercourse," in Laird's
83
phrase, or, in Wieman's phrase, an "order of communication?"
Is the objective existence of values a clue to a universe
which is ultimately personal, and realizes values as a subject,
84 85
as A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, Brightman, and Sorley would
have it? Or, is the universe indifferent to values, as Perry
conceives it? None of these questions as to the nature of
ultimate reality can receive a direct answer from the principle
of value process. The principle permits any of these views,
but favors none. The nature of the objective reality in which
the objective existence of value process is grounded must
be decided on the basis of additonal considerations.
A final observation has to do with the ethical quality
of value. The objective existence of value is not limited
by the value process to values. Disvalue exists objectively
as well. This fact is a safeguard against the ambiguity which
82. P6IC, 295.
83. MD, 156. Although not subscribing to any type of
theism, Laird prefers this type of impersonal theism.
84. IG, 110, 254, 294f., 341.
85. PI, 89f., 149, 171f. Cf. iTP, I62ff.
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declares for the correlation of existence and value, and
then, on the one hand, calls value good and identifies it
with God, and on the other hand, calls existence either good
86
or bad. The universe may he, as idealism claims, "on the
87
side of man's deepest and best desires," but disvalue
has as good an empirical claim to objectivity as value. That
the objective reality of the latter may transcend the objective
existence of the former is a matter upon which the principle
of value process cannot pass judgment. As Laird observes,
"it is impossible to prove from empirical data by themselves
88
that the universe has a bias toward the good ... ."
3. THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
This division of the chapter will discuss several
theories of personal identity, and point out their consistency
or their inconsistency with the empirical facts of personal
identity. Then a principle to formulate the facts of personal
identity as they relate to philosophical positions consistent
with them will be proposed.
i. Empirical Evidence . The following scientific explanation
of personal identity is based upon the empirical evidence
89
formulated in the ego principle:
Personal identity is inseparably a part of the experience
of self-consciousness. Reference to one's past requires it.
It is presupposed by the self-enhancing quality of ideal action.
86. If. Laird, ME, 208.
87. PI, 190.
88. SR, 145.
89. See above, pages 35, 40f
. , 47, 51-60.

Present actions and future plans are made in terms of the
person's own past and his hope for what he may become. _er-
sonal identity is sharpened by the sense of reality that
separates a person from his environment. As an identical
person he accepts or rejects the flow of facts in his envi-
ronment .
In short, personal identity is implicit in conscious-
ness when it emerges to help the individual meet a complex
situation.
^
However, although personal identity is the living unity
of a person at any particular time of his conscious experi-
ence, he is not always conscious. The persistence of per-
sonality as a unified process must bridge gaps of uncon-
sciousness, due to sleep or coma. There is no empirical
evidence that it survives death. Unconsciousness introduces
an interruption in unity which is just as much a fact of
mental life as consciousness.
There follows an exposition of each of several varying
theories' of personal identity, and a comparison of each with
the empirical evidence. Then the theories will be evaluated,
and a principle of personal identity formulated.
Theories of personal identity fall into three classes.
Neo-realism, some absolute idealisms, and instrumentalism
deny ontological significance to personal identity. Sub-
stantialistic theories regard personal identity as an effect
90. Cf. above, page$ 35.
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of an ontological substance. Personal idealism regards per-
sonal identity as itself ontologically real. Each class of
theories will be discussed in turn.
ii. Empirically Invalid Theories . The fact of personal
identity refutes Humean theories that deny the intrinsic
connectedness within mind of mental phenomena, and absolut-
ist theories that deny real agency to persons.
The relational theory of mind finds the unity of mind
outside of the sense of personal identity. A pattern of
relations existing within the field of objects selected by
the responding organism is the unity of the mind. The neu-
tral fragments of nature, which take on a mental .aspect
when they constitute a field of response, constitute for the
responding organism "a peculiar interrelation and compose a
91 kfen.particular pattern," which is conscious mind. Mind, "made
of the same stuff as are solar systems, atoms, and living
92
cells," consists of all the objects it relates. Conscious-
ness is the correspondence of bodily changes and changes
within the environment. Thus, consciousness is "out there
93
wherever the things specifically responded to are." As
Charles W. Morris points out, relegating the contents of
experience to a non-mental universe provides a "metaphysical
rock" for the house of behaviorism.^ All mental qualities
are out in the open, where they can be observed.
91. Perry, PPT, 277; cf. chap, xii, and Holt, CC, 82.
92. Anderson, Art. (1942), 260.
93. Holt, ijR, 354. Cf. -Anderson's position
,
Dago 6Qi
above, and Morris, STM, 102-148.
94. STM, 114.
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Laird rejects this reduction of mind to a relational
pattern of neutral events. Such a theory deals with the
object of consciousness to the exclusion of the subject of
consciousness, '//hen a thing appears, "it must appear i»o
something, and this something must be or contain awareness
or consciousness." "...A mens moment ane
a
is not a mind at
95
all." The conscious sifcject possesses at least a modicum
of "togetherness" which gives unity to mind, and assures the
personal identity of the individual.
In the light of the empirical evidence for the exis-
tence of continuing personal identity of the conscious
subject, Laird's criticism is valid. The unity of con-
sciousness in which recollection and anticipation partici-
pate in the present activity of the person presupposes per-
sonal identity, and not an external collocation of neutral
events which the presence of an organism graces with mental-
ity.
Absolute idealism, in F. H. Bradley's presentation of
it, shares with neo-realism an extrinsic view of mind, for
in neither case does mind have reality in and for itself.
For strict neo-realism, just presented, mind is a pattern
that distinguishes one group of neutral entities from
others. Absolute idealism regards finite mind as a distinc-
tion within the Absolute that separates one mode of appear-
ance of the Absolute from another.
95. SR, 164, 153.
96. Laird, SR, 153, 176.
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According to Bradley, the conscious subject is not "a
Q7
thing actually "by itself; it is at one with all appearance
in its ontological status. Conscious subject does not give
98
unity to the temporal series, although, in appearing to
qqhave "a before and after of itself," it provides identity
for the individual's life, and comes nearest in the scale of
appearances to indicating the nature of the Absolute.
But it is entangled in temporal contradictions, and cannot
resolve the problem of diversity and unity. Hence, the
conscious subject is not an ontological unit; it is at one
with all appearances and error. Nevertheless, "the Absolute
appears in its phenomena and is real nowhere outside
them. "'-^ The internal distinctions of the Absolute are
102included within its fulness.
On this view, mind is reduced to a pattern of appear-
ances whose distinction from other appearances depends upon
no otherness which it possesses ontologically. Bradley's
view denies positive significance to the empirical facts of
reality feeling, upon which personal identity depends. The
feeling of reality is essential to the individual because he
is willing to form purposes and execute plans only if he
feels that in so doing he is a real agent in a real world.
An apparent agent in an apparent world is not consistent
with the facts. As Laird asserts, we are "more confident
97. AR, 30.
98. AR, 316.
$g. ETR, 414; cf. AR, 302.
ClOO. AR, 260.
C101. AR, 486.
C102. AR', 331-533.

of the reality of our conscious personality . . . than of the
103
reality of the transfigured selfhood. " J This may be a
monistic cosmos, as Bradley affirms, "but the empirical facts
demand that individual action within it be real, and not
apparent. The alternative is self-refuting skepticism that
makes of all our experience an illusion, including the
skeptic's claim to truth.
John Dewey does not speak directly of personal identity,
but his distinction between mind and consciousness covers
much the same ground. He agrees with the strict neo-real-
ists and Bradley that mind's reality is not in and for itself.
He agrees with Bradley that mind is part of a process, but
regards this process, not as the workings within itself of
the Absolute, but as the, ongoing process of natural events.
Thought is "a natural event occurring within nature" as one
of its traits.\^ An event is a process that has a beginning
and on end. At any particular point in the process the com-
plex integration of organism and environment is experi-
10 5
ence. Consciousness is the symbolic aspect of experience.
It is an objective fact in a world in which everything is
objective. To regard the conscious subject as existing in
and for himself gives rise to the "intellectual lock-jaw
called epistemology . "-^^ Since the course of events is
metaphysically real, mind shares in this reality as a
103. SR, 179.
104. EN, 68.
105. Morris concludes that this is Dewey's position,
after examining the various ways in which Dewey uses the
term. STM, 290-294.
106. EWJ, 74, |.
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function within "incessant "beginnings and endings" of natu-
107
ral process. The purpose the individual seeks to accom-
plish, the values he achieves, the techniques of control he
develops, "belong to the event of which they are a part in
the field of experience, and not to the mind in which they
108
may appear.
But, while accepting the tenet of epistemological
monism that denies the reality of subjective consciousness
consciousness, Dewey diverges from Bradley's view by insist-
ing that mind is an pffective instrument in the natural
process, and from strict neo-realism, described above, by
making mind a relatively permanent event.
Dewey regards mind as a causal instrument. While
knowing is the symbolic register of experience, it also
indicates " the way of interaction by which other natural
interactions become subject to direction. "-^9 quest for
Certainty argues for experimental control of future events,
rather than a harking back to some fixed realm of Being as
the basis of certainty of human values.^® "... Action is
the heart of ideas" ... and ... "doing ... /Is7 the heart of
111knowing." Mind "is an agency of novel reconstruction of
112
a preexisting order." It is a trait of natural events
that can give direction to their sequence. Its ideas are
107. EN, 98.
108. Cf. EN, 217-222.
109. QC, 107.
110. Cf. his statement of the problem of philosophy,
QC, 46.
111. QC, 36, 167.
112. EN, 217.
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"the promise of things hoped for, the symbol of things not
1.113seen."
As a temporal enclosure, mind differs from other events
because of its greater persistence. Mind is a "connected
whole" which "extends beyond a particular process of con-
sciousness and conditions it. H Relative to the conscious
flux of perceptions and ideas, mind is permanent and struc-
tural. Consciousness forces a re-direction of meanings
115
within the system of meanings that is mind, but only
gradually. In contrast to the "contextual and persistent"
nature of mind, consciousness is "a series of heres and
116
nows." It is extremely instable, passing from wide
awake, awake, drowsy, dreaming and fast asleep, according
as an organism is actively partaking, or abstaining from
117partaking, in the course of events."
Dewey's concept of mind roughly corresponds to the
concept of personal identity herein presented. Mind persists
through change. Ideas function as ego-ideals, directing the
course of events relevant to the system of meaning, that is,
the mind, of which they are a part. Dewey objectifies the
conscious subject, but as part of objective event, the indi-
vidual has a continuity due to the somewhat lengthy time
span of the mind. There is a measure of intrinsic "together-
ness," which strict neo-realism entirely lacks. Further,
113. Ibid., 350.
114. Ibid., 307.
115. Ibid., 311.
116. Ibid., 303.
117. Ibid., 313.
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Dewey recognizes that the individual, through his ideas, is
an effective causal instrument. He can make a difference in
the course of events. He is no mere irrelevant appearance
within a changeless process. As Morris states it, "for
Dewey the organism is a going concern in a world which is
118
a going concern."
However, the structure of mind and the end-in-view
effort of the organism does not have personal identity as
its presupposition. Structure of mind presupposes a slower
tempo of change as compared to other events of a mental
character in the natural process. The persistence of mind
is an external affair, very much like the persistence of a
house. Its constancy provides a relatively fixed point by
means of which other events may be measured and controlled.
"Structure is constancy of means, of things used for con-
sequences, not of things taken by themselves or absolutely.
"
Thus, there is no such thing as an epistemological
subject mastering environment on his own behalf. The con-
trol by thought of the direction of natural process pre-
supposes one aspect of the process ma king experience more
satisfactory to it. However, this experience is objective
in the process. Personality is an instrument within a pro-
cess whose only teleology is the end of an event. This
Dewey names "natural teleology," so that, in thinking of
teleology, the mind will be weaned away from "partisan and
120
ego-centric interest."
118. Morris, STM, 294.
119. Dewey, EN, 72.
120. Ibid., 98.
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The full weight of Dewey's position rests upon the
principle of instrumental "behavior. The end which the indi-
vidual's mental reactive equipment serves is not the ego in
and for itself. The ego-principle, with its emphasis upon
personal identity as the presupposition of self-directional
activity, is not complementary, in Dewey's theory, to the
principle of instrumental behavior; and none of the empiri-
cal principles is valid out of the context of the others.
Stern and the neo-scholastics agree that mental life
requires a substratum for its support. Stern points out
that experience itself, without the benefit of philosophi-
cal theory, looks at mental phenomena, processes, and states
as adjectival to something that has them. Desire J. Mercier
agrees that every vital act requires a substratum. As Stern
puts it, "Nicht die Existenz des Substrats, sondern nur
121
seine Art kann in Prage stehen. " It is with respect to
the nature of the substratum that the views differ.
According to neo-scholasticism, corporeal matter gets
its form and its function from the soul. "...The natural
exercise of the highest activities of the soul require a
122body. Soul and body are in fact one substance, namely, a
person. However, soul does not become material because it
invests body with form. "...Its spiritual powers or facul-
ties are xeft over and emerge, so to speak, from the
121. AP, 96; uP, 68, 69. Cf. Mercier, MBffSP, I, 294f.
122. mercier, BEttSP, I, 308.
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material compound it informs." Thus, persons can per-
form immaterial acts, such as willing and thinking, and so
are different from animals. The existence of the soul is
attested to by memory, the feeling of personal continuity,
124
and responsibility. These facts render the soul inde-
pendent of body for its existence— "...it is essentially
125
subsistent," and therefore incorruptible and immortal.
Aa a rational animal, man "stands midway where the two
126great orders of created beings meet." The subsisting soul
of man differs both in greatness and in kind from the sub-
127
stance which is Lrod. The word, substance, applies to all
beings only in an analogical sense. "...God is being per
se and all being, esse irreceptum , whereas creatures have
received such being as they possess, and possess it depen-
128dently and in a certain degree only, esse participatum .
"
Neo-scholasticism regards soul-substance as the guaran-
tee of personal identity. The soul must be different from
its phenomena, because substance must be distinct from acci-
129dents. Personal identity is an accident of soul-substance.
As Hugh J. Tallon presses home in his objection to con-
sciousness as a metaphysical principle, soul-substance
supports mental life during the interruption of conscious-
ness. The rest sleep affords, and the resumption of inter-
123. Ibid., 309.
124. Ibid.
, 294.
125. Ibid., 309.
126. Ibid., 302.
127. Cf. Taalon, CS, 116.
128. Mercier, MMSP, I, 521.
129. Ibid., 295
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rupted conscious activity, point to "a reality still exis-
130tent "behind the unconsciousness."
Stern posits a psycho-physically neutral substance
which supports mind and "body in a unitas multi-olex . and
whose existence lies " das jenseits oder voider Scheidung zv/ischen
131Psychischem und Physischen . " This neutral substance is
a safeguard against regarding the mind as an aggregate of
elements, a member of a dualistic parallelism, or an attri-
. . 132bute of a materialistic or spiritualistic monism.
Empirical disunity of conflicting purposes are a demonstra -
tion of the existence of the neutral substance; "...den
Xnderung und Spaltung setzen Einheit voraus . The unity
of personality gives meaning to each of the conflicting
purposes, and so mediates the multiplicity: "...die Person
kampft mit sich ; sie spaltet sich auf , urn immer wieder die
Spaltung durch ihre Einheit und in ihrer Einheit zu uber-
winden. "^-^
Stern's view differs from the neo-scholastic view of
soul-substance because the psycho-physically neutral sub-
stance is itself the ultimate stuff of the universe. There
is no plurality of substances, different in kind, owing
their existence to the grace of u-od. Common to all sub-
stance are unity, individuality, and telic activity. Sub-
stance is arranged in a hierarchy, from atoms to the Abso-
lute. Each member of the hierarchy is open to the modalities
130. CS, 135.
131. AP, 97? GP, 69.
132. AP? 11, 12; G-P, 7, 8; AP, 118, GP, 85.
133. AP, 604; AP, 436.
134. AP, 623; ^P, 449. Cf. Allport, PPI, 351 n.
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of the other members. Prom any point in the hierarchy,
superior entities are persons, and inferior entities are
things. The furthest reach of personal substance, the
135Absolute, coexists with the universe.
The major criticism of Stern's position, and that of the
neo-scholastics , is that they are presented as matters of
empirical necessity, when actually they are abstractions
from the empirical facts they claim to explain. Empirically,
personal identity is inseparable from the experience of self-
consciousness. The sense of personal identity is part of
the appropriation of one's past experience. It is presupposed
by the self-enhancing quality of ideal action, and it is
sharpened by the sense of reality that marks a person other
than his environment, it owes nothing to any metaphysical
substance they may undergird it, as far as psychological
analysis can show. To appeal to memory, the feeling of
continuity, and the sense of responsibility, as proof of the
existence of metaphysical substance begs the question. "It
does not make the connectedness of properties;" observes Laird,
136
"it only describes their connectedness." Likewise Stern,
for example, hypostatizes the fact that one person may possess
conflicting purposes into an underlying and embracing 'unity
in multiplicity' which is psycho-physically neutral substance.
To quote Laird again, "substance is always a descriptive
137
term indi eating a unity which exists de facto."
155, Cf. AP, 93-142; GP, 68-100; WP, 94-96; Knudson, PP, 25
136. SR, 172f.
137. SR, 172.
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Once posited, substance as noumenal presumes to solve
the problems before which, as phenomenal, it was helpless.
How account for discontinuity in consciousness? Easily
enough; consciousness is an accident of substance which is
continuous, and hence consciousness may reappear. Empirically,
this is equivalent to saying that the presence of personal
identity accounts for the absence of personal identity. How
escape elementalism, parallelism and reductionism? By ascrib-
ing mental phenomena, processes and states to self-conscious
unity, which is implicit in them, but after the fact of unity
has been reified into a psycho-physical neutral substance.
This reified abstraction is at most an acknowledgment of the
empirical facts. Unitas multiplex is a matter of conscious
138
experience, independent of any underlying entity.
iii. Empirically Valid Theories . In preference to substance
"in some recondite metaphysical sense," Laird accepts what he
139
calls "concrete empirical substances." Mind is a "living
continuity of desiring, choosing, perceiving and similar
140
experiencings. " This unity of continuity constitutes
concrete empirical substance. The phenomenal self is the real
self. There is no need to "suppose that a metaphvsically
141
egoistic substance keeps the empirical ego together."
Although it is difficult to defend personal identity against
the facts of interrupted consciousness, such as sleep or coma,
it is foolhardy to deny personal identity. Peter's identity
138. Cf. Knudson, PP, 325.
139. m, 85.
140. SR, 172.
141. HD, 85, cf. SR, 172.
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may have gaps in it, but he awakes the self-same Peter.
"Peter is when he exists . When he does not exist there is
142
naturally no Peter."
Laird* s position beings out two empirical conditions upon
143
which personal idealism basis its position. One is its
strength, and the other is its main weakness. The strength
of personal idealism is its full acceptance of self-conscious
unity, as it exists empirically, as a metaphysical principle.
144
"... The self of experience is the true ontological self."
The weakness of personal idealism is the weakness of its
principle. "Our conscious life," in Brightman's words, "is
145
notoriously fragmentary." Yet in it personalism sees the
key to reality. There is the "profoundest significance" in
the fact that "the self has may ideas, does many things, and
is subject to constant change, yet it is conscious of itself
146
as one and identical with itself."
Prom this fact of self-conscious unity Knudson infers
a reality constituted of may real individuals. This inference
is based upon our ability to distinguish between one's self
and everything other than one's self. By analogy to the
unity, retained by the indvidual in his interaction with that
which is other than himself, a doctrine of metaphysical monism
is declared. Since the subject of this monism is personal,
self-conscious deity, interaction of two unlike qualities such
142. SR, 177-; cf. 176.
143. Laird calls his own point of view logical pluralism.
With certain precautions we may know things as they are. Each
fact of knowledge is true in its own right; it requires no
systematic connection with the rest of reality for its validity
Laird is wary about going beyond the empirical facts. Cf. SR,
144. Aimason, PP, 325.
145. ITP, 174f.
146. Knudson, PP, 83f.
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as physical and psychic is as intelligible on a cosmic scale
as it is on the microcosmic scale of self-conscious unity.
Finite self-directional activity points to volitional cau-
sality within the nature of the universe. Matter, time and
space do not share the capacity to persist the same through
change, and so their reality is phenomenal; it is valid for
part of the universe, and not for the whole. Phenomenal
reality exists by virtue of divine energizing. While it is
other to us, we can truly apprehend it, for nature is the
product of self-conscious Being; and since we are likewise
self-conscious, we can understand the product of self-conscious
147
Activity.
Accepting the phenomenal self as ontologically real,
personal idealism seeks to understand what is beyond man in
terms of the fact of self-conscious unity that is found in man.
However, finite consciousness is but a clue to reality.
"Personalism does not mean that ultimate reality is just like
148
your mind and mine with all their defects." Complete
unconsciousness means that the self is non-existent. This
fact points to the imperfection of human selves, which are
"dependent on the rest of the universe for their continued
149
existence." Nevertheless, our incomplete and fragmentary
consciousness "fills out the notion of true being more
150
completely than any other form of finite existence." Hence,
147. Knudson, 168-246; 152f. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 218*.,
223, 245-248.
148. ITP, 210.
149. ITP, 197.
150. Knudson, PP, 327.
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consciousness may survive not only the breaks in its temporal
existence, "but there is also "a presumption in favor of its
151
continued existence after death."
iv. The Principle of Personal Identity . The unity of
consciousness depends upon continuity of mental life within
a conscious subject. This empirical fact refutes the attempt
to make the personal identity of conscious experience merely
an objective distinction within an objective situation, as
neo-realism and instrumentalism do. Nor does instrumentalism
salvage "togetherness" of mental phenomena by troadening the
time span of mind-event. Such a view of mind still. leaves it
merely a distinction within a process with which it is at one.
The same observation is true of Bradley's absolute idealism,
but from a different empirical approach. Personal agency
as appearance carnio?~produce personal identity as appearance.
Mind's appearance possesses no distinction in its own right
from other appearance. Its distinction is proved by an absolute
process
.
Against the merging of subject and object the empirical
evidence for self-identity protests. Epistemological monism
is faced with the stubborn empirical fact that the ability to
accept or reject something as real presupposes personal
identity over against which the something is objective, other
than. Monism may be true from an external point of view of
na tural or absolute process, but, in jorightman's words, this
152
leaves us human beings still on a dualistic basis."
151. knudson, PP, 327.
152. ITP, 89.
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Personal identity as an empirical fact owes nothing to
any metaphysical substance upon which it may "be "based. In
seeking to explain the facts of conscious experience, substanae
theories merely duplicate the facts with an abstraction, which
is then offered as a support for the facts from which it has
been abstracted. Obviously, such a circuitous procedure
explains nothing. The only "substance" that can be empirically
verified is the concrete empirical "substance" of self-
conscious unity itself.
Personal idealism is thoroughly consistent with empirical
evidence when it finds in personal identity its metaphysical
starting place. Laird, with his suspicien of imprudent
generalizations that go beyond the evidence of waking experience,
admits that "the self is also a part of the cosmos and knit
153
with it." However, empirical evidence cannot establish
the relationship of the part to the whole. In its analogical
use of the unity of self-consciousness, personalism makes of
man a microcosm. What is in his world is central in the
world. Depending only on the empirical evidence supporting
the ego-principle, personalism proves too much. On the other
hand, it is only the theory that accepts the phenomenal self
as the ontological self that is consistent with the ego
principle. Neo-realism, absolute idealism, instrumentalism,
and substantialism fail because they do not accept the empirical
evidence on its face value. The empirical evidence does not
153. 3R, 179; cf. MD, 96, 97, 217.
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require the metaphysics of personal idealism, but it provides
the enabling act upon which personal idealism may legislate
its metaphysical constitution.
The evaluation of the various theories of personal
identity herein presented makes it clear that there ere two
philosophical positions that are favored by the empirical
evidence of the ego principle. In the first place,
epistemological dualism is favored rather than epistemological
monism. In the second nlace, the empirical evidence permits
an ontological view of the self that is based on the fact that
personal identity persists through change. These two positions
are implicit in the following principle:
Personal identity, in relating ©hanging events to
personal continuity, requires an objective reference.
Conscious recognition of personal continuity differentiates
the personality process from any other known process. Only on
a personal plan is change and identity, unity and multiplicity,
intelligible. On the foundation of this unique difference
personal idealism builds its metaphysical house.
The corollary of personal identity is a sense of reality
that determines whether that which is other than the ego is
to be accepted as real, or rejected. Personal identity requires
an objective reference. It depends upon environment — con-
ceptual, social, and -ohysical — for its existence. It is not
154
a closed entity, a "repellent unity." It retains its
154. Laird, SR, 178.
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identity as an end-in-itself through the process of inter-
action. It is different from its environment, and this fact
of difference favors epistemological dualism.
jno claim is made that personal identity is to be
identified with personality process. It is not the whole
process. This fact leaves room for the cessation of personal
identity due to fatigue, injury, or drugs. What remains in
the absence of personal identity is not personality process
in its fulSmess, no more than personal identity is in itself
personality process in its fulness. Personality process
involves both brain and consciousness.
This chapter has made explicit certain philosophical
issues involved in psychology, and it has made psychological
data philosophically relevant. The final chapter presents
an empirically derived, ultimate principle for interpreting
psychological data and theory.

CHAPTER IV
AN ULTIMATE AND IRREDUCIBLE PRINCIPLE
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a philosophi-
cal principle for interpreting psychological data and theory.
The first step in this construction is to establish the phe-
nomenal truth of the empirical foundations upon which it will
rest. This will be accomplished by formulating a scientific
category for psychology. The second step is to establish a
principle that relates empirically valid philosophical posi-
tions to the phenomenal principle. The third step is to show
that this principle is ultimate and irreducible. The final
section of the chapter relates psychological data and theory
to the principle.
This chapter will complete the task of philosophy of
psychology. Points of view on the philosophical issues that
have been made explicit in the previous chapter will be made
coherent by a principle derived from the empirical basis
established in the second chapter; and this principle will be
used to interpret psychological theory and data. The infer-
ences of this chapter depend upon and presuppose the conclu-
sions reached in the previous chapters.
1. A SCIENTIFIC CATEGORY
i. The Necessary Character of the Principles. The three
principles established in the previous chapter are consistent
with the empirical evidence. Their truth may be demonstrated
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by showing that to deny them makes experience impossible
within the universe of discourse for which they claim to be
valid. Since only a part of the universe is involved, the
truth thus established is scientific.
The first principle states that bodily processes influ-
ence, condition, and are instrumental to, self-determined
experience. To deny the function of bodily processes here
attributed to them implies that self-determined experience is
a product of discarnate mind. This may be possible somewhere
else in the universe, but it is not true within the realm of
psychological discourse for which the validity of the principle
is asserted. To deny that experience is self-determined im-
plies that bodily processes function without conscious direction.
From the point of view of the universe as a whole, self-deter-
mination may be an index of the r6le we have to play, in a
determined way, in a superpersonal Whole. But, within the
part of the universe covered by the principle of self-deter-
mination, the absence of self-determination makes an area of
experience impossible.
The second principle maintains that value process is a
function of personal purpose, and exists objectively. The
causal nature of ideal motivation may be denied of the uni-
verse as a whole, but to deny it of value process makes the
experience of values impossible. Unless inner life and envi-
ronment can be controlled in the interests of an ideal, values
cannot be realized. Further, to deny any objectivity what-
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soever to values implies that values are purely subjective.
Consequently, no value would exist outside of subjective
valuers. That being the case, not even the value of the
proposed truth, that values are subjective, is objective.
The alternative to the objectivity of values, in some sense,
1
is solipsism.
The third principle asserts that personal identity is
essential to the personality process. If personal identity
is not essential, then Peter could wake up as Paul. There
would be no assurance of personal continuity, and the unity
of mental life would be impossible. Further, the absence of
personal identity means the absence of the distinction between
subject and object. Without this distinction, there can be
no reality feeling, and without reality feeling, personality
2
identity is impossible. Thought must have an objective
reference that is accepted as real.
In view of these considerations, no alternative theory
is valid for the empirical basis upon which the three princi-
ples advanced in this chapter were constructed. This means
that the principles are categorical in quality, for "a category
may be identified by the fact that, if it be not true, a whole
3
system of experience is impossible." There are two kinds of
categories, namely, scientific and metaphysical. Scientific
1 . See above, pagesfo8-100.
2. See above, pages 55f.
3. Brightman, IPT, 97. Cf. 93-97.
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categories are true of part of the universe. Metaphysical
categories assert a truth about the whole of the universe.
The next section of this chapter proposes a scientific category
for psychology,
ii. Statement of the Category. The principle of self-
determination is an acknowledgment of: (1) that personality
process is conditioned and influenced by the nature of the
mental reactive equipment of its bodily instrument; and (2)
that personality process is, within this limitation, subject
to self-conscious direction as it makes adjustments to envi-
ronmental conditions. The principle of value process asserts:
(1) that personality process is causal in nature; and (2) that
values have more than a subjective existence. Their realization
involves their objectivity. The principle of personal identity
recognizes that personal identity: (1) is the presupposition
of conscious experience; and (2) implies epistemological dualism.
A survey of the constituent elements in these principles
indicates that there are four, namely: (1) the bodily instru-
ment (principle of self-determination); (2) self-directional
activity (principles of self-determination and value process);
(3) the objective reference of conscious experience (principles
of value process and personal identity); and (4) personal
identity (the principle of personal identity).
These elements may be reconstituted into a single principle
formulated in these words: Self-directional activity, utilizing
the bodily instrument to serve personal needs, desires and
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purposes, makes an objective difference that constantly re-
affirms personal identity.
This single principle, the phenomenal category for psy-
chology, is valid only if it bears a broad interpretation in
keeping with the empirical basis of philosophy of psychology
which it presupposes. The striving to realize all desires
and needs, from the merely organic to idealistic, from
rational to insane, from abstract reasoning to hammering a
nail, are included within the phrase, "self-directional
activity. This principle interprets mental reactive equip-
ment as a bodily function that serves in the realization of
values sought in self-directional activity. V/here there is
no body, or where body is defective or ineffective, the
individual is deprived of proper instruments. Self-directional
activity operates on the assurance that its efforts have some
kind of objective validity. And, finally, the implication of
all self-directional activity is the personal identity, attested
to by the experience of self-consciousness, of the actor.
2. A PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE
i. Statement of the Principle . The following principle
is proposed to relate empirically valid philosophical positions
to the scientific category: Self-directional activity, and the
social and natural process on which it depends, are grounded
in personal deity who promotes and conserves values.
This principle is based upon philosophical positions which,
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in the previous chapter, were proved consonant with empirical
facts
.
In the first place, it accepts divine immanence as an
explanation of the interaction of mind and body. The bodily
instrument, as well as the directing mental agency, depend
for their correlative existence upon God. The world of nature,
including the physical body, is provided by God as an instru-
ment of, and a field for, self-directional activity.
In the second place, the principle defines the place of
values within objective reality. Self-directional activity
requires some kind of objective validity for its achievement
of values. The objectivity of values is guaranteed by the
appreciation of them by divine mind. This is at least one
way in which God participates in social process. Further,
the principle affirms volitional causality as a metaphysical
category. God as well as man is striving to make the social
process he shares with man increasingly better. This assertion
contains the judgment that values are ultimately real, and
transcend evil values.
In the third place, attributing ontological significance
to persons is an acceptance of the phenomenal self as the real
self. On this basis, their exists a presumption in favor of
immortality. However, the fact that values are ultimately real
limits this presumption to persons who are motivated by good
will. Hence, the conditional use of the word "may" in the
wording of the principle. 4
4. For the empirical validation of these three positions,
see above, pages 77, 95, 117, 119.
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The proposed philosophical principle relates the above
positions accepted in their construction to the phenomenal
category of psychology.
In the first place, the utilizing of the bodily instru-
ment to serve personal needs, desires and purposes is grounded
in the doctrine of divine immanence.
In the second place, the objective difference that self-
directional activity makes is grounded in the will and purpose
of God.
In the third place, the constant re-affirmation of per-
sonal identity through self-directional activity is grounded
in the ontological significance conditionally granted to the
self by God.
3. CATEGORICAL NATURE OF THE PRINCIPLE
The distinction between mind and body reaches far afield
philosophically. The problem of mind involves theories as to
the nature of mind, of the objective validity of thought and
of values. The problem of body is part of the problem of the
nature of physical things, evolution, and cosmic mechanism.
The rational disposition of these two lines of thinking is an
ultimate explanation of the universe. The position taken with
respect to the distinction between and relation of mind and
non-mind marks one as a skeptic, a positivist, and as a realist
or idealist of any one of a number of varieties. On all of
these philosophical issues the proposed principle implies a
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stand opposed to other positions. Attention will be drawn
to this opposition, and then some conclusions as to the
categorical nature of the proposed principle offered,
i. The Nature of Mind, The proposed principle posits
J&r the self-directional nature of mind. Acting on his own
purposes, each person affirms his personal identity, or
selfhood. The fact of purposive selfhood refutes theories
that deny intrinsic connectedness within mind of mental
phenomena, and absolutist theories that deny real agency to
persons. It refutes theories that make mind merely the motion
of matter in space. Strict neo-realism, instrumentalism,
absolute idealism and behaviorism are rejected as unsatis-
factory interpretations of the nature of mind. Substance
theories of mind are rejected as being mere logically cir-
5
cuitous abstractions. There is one aspect of instrumentalism
that is consistent with the proposed principle. That is the
fact that the individual, through his ideas, is an effective
causal instrument. But, the proposed principle interprets
this fact with reference to the intrinsic purposes of the
self, and not, as instrumentalism does, as a function within
an experience pattern.
ii. Objective Validity of Thought. Epistemology involves
two considerations. The first has to do with the distinction
between subject and object. The second raises the question of
the objective validity of ideas.
5. See above, pages 68ff. , 83ff
.
,
104ff.
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The first consideration involves the distinction between
subject and object. Panob jec tivistic epistemological monism
of neo-realism asserts that the subject exists only as part
of an objective pattern. Absolutist epistemological monism
regards the subject as existing merely as a distinction within
the one Self that alone has experience. These positions are
contradicted by the assertion that personal identity is
ontologically significant. Mind is intrinsically other than
its objects. The object and the idea of it are not the same.
To philosophy of psychology as herein proposed only episte-
mological dualism is acceptable.
This dualism is justified by a mentalistic view of the
universe. The knowing mind can understand facts of other mind
because it is itself mind, and the facts of nature are under-
standable because nature is a product of mind. Personal
functioning is socialized experience that uses as an instru-
ment for its purposes the material conditions in which God is
immanent.^
A second factor involved in epistemology is the objective
validity of ideas. Self-directional activity makes an objective
difference. Ideas are instrumental to self-directional activity.
Therefore, ideas are trans-sub jec tively valid. This gives
objective validity to false ideas as well as true ideas. Thus,
the persistence of error is accounted for. False ideas may be
pragmatically justified. Roman Catholicism and Russellism
6. See above, pages 104**., 115ff
.
,
118f.
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represent incompatible ideas; yet both have practical effects
that make them real to their adherents. Each person accredits
his ideas as real when they may consistently be included within
the coherent system of ideas which he accredits as real. The
reality feeling is a constituent of personal identity that
self-directional activity affirms. 7 For philosophy of psy-
chology, the epistemological question becomes: are ideas
empirically accredited as real, ultimately real? Are they
coherent within a consistent system of thought that has the
entire universe as its realm of discourse? If so, the idea
is true; if not, the idea is false.
Since, according to the hypothesis herein advanced, God
is personal, it is conceivable that truth is his conscious
possession, and so is structural to ultimate reality. The
conscious possession of truth by God would correspond to
finite reality feeling. The fact that erroneous judgments
of finite persons make a difference objectively, and persist,
suggests that God respects other persons in the social process
which he sustains, and in which he participates. But, since
God also respects truth, false judgments are not ultimately
real. They are relative to human ignorance, to which they
owe their existence and persistence. They lose their
objective validity with the advance of scientific knowledge
and moral insight.
In contrast to this position, materialism and absolute
idealism cannot adequately account for error. For materialism,
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the distinction between truth and error is invalid, for there
is no reason why one operation of matter in motion should be
true and another false. For absolute idealism, error belongs
to the Absolute, and so is ultimately real. The proposed
principle opposes both of these positions. It affirms the
distinction between truth and error as real, but ascribes
ultimate reality only to truth.
iii. Objective Validity of Values. The philosophy of psy-
chology herein proposed regards values as part of the structure
of ultimate reality. God participates in social process by
guaranteeing the ultimate objectivity of values by his appreci-
ii
ation of them. In seeking to achieve values, we work in coop-
eration with the social purposes of God. Indifference or hos-
tility toward values results in the creation of disvalues. These
g
are objective in the four senses mentioned above. Evil inten-
tions are as much a part of a conceptual system as values.
Evil is socially relevant. Evil deeds are at least as real
as the evil doer. They are the functioning of personal pur-
pose. But, the objectivity of disvalue is not permanent.
God rejects them. Therefore they can exist in the social
process only so long as there are evil or indifferent people.
They are relative to human perversity, to which they owe their
existence and persistence. The increase of good valuers is
the answer to disvalues. As Perry's moral idealism main-
8. See above, pages 98ff.; see lQlf.

133
tains, by human effort "the world shall become good through
9
the elimination of evil."
However, the human struggle takes place in an ethically
indifferent universe from Perry's standpoint. Contrary to
this standpoint, the view herein accepted asserts that the
universe is- friendly to value. It makes a difference to a
personal God whether a man is good or evil. It is not un-
thinkable that the ontological significance of the self is
withdrawn at death where utter lack of good will characterizes
its self-directional activity. Immortality is, however, meta-
physically plausible. Personal identity survives temporal
breaks. On the assumption that it is ontologically significant,
personality may survive death. But, immortality is morally
plausible only for men of good will. God will give eternal
ontological significance to those, who, within the light they
have, prove themselves willing to cooperate in his purposes,
for unless there is a way for the continuance
of the human self, the world is full of blunt
edges of human meanings, the wreckage of
humannvalues , and therefore the failures of
God.
This position attributes volitiona.1 causality to all person-
al function, including God's, and it insists upon the moral
responsibility of man and God. Good values are ultimately real
priHE, 249. See above, pages 88f.
10. Hocking, TDL, 111; cf. 107-111, Knudson, DR, 497,
Montague, CSD, 94f.
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in their objectivity, and by them the objectivity of evil
values is transcended. Good values are ultimately real be-
cause their objectivity resides in a personal God. 3y them
the objectivity of evil values is transcended. Of the three
empirically valid value theories, only Sorley f s is compatible
with this position. For Perry, God has no volitional causality.
11
For Wieraan, objective values are impersonal in their nature.
Mechanical causation and causation as a logical deduction from
a system of the Absolute, or from the essence of an event, are
12
excluded by the hypothesis of volitional causality. Theo-
logically, predestination is precluded, and real freedom of
will maintained. The denial of immortality and natural im-
mortality are barred in favor of moral immortality. Unlike
absolute idealism, for which disvalue is part of the Absolute,
and so ultimately real, and materialism, which acknowledges no
moral distinctions, the proposed principle affirms the dis-
tinction between right and wrong, and ascribes ultimate reality
only to right.
iv. Extra-mental Reality. The proposed principle passes
judgment upon the universe in its extra-mental (i.e., natural)
aspect.
God provides the world of nature, including the physical
body, as a field in, and an instrument by which, self-
directional activity may function. Nature at once helps in
11. See above, pages 90, 93, 95.
12. See above, pages 98.
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realizing ideals, and is an obstacle that frustrates their
attainment. The latter consideration makes it unwise to
regard as providential natural events that happen to fall out
to the benefit of man. Dysteleological facts refute this view.
The natural order may limit us, but we are, however, not
limited in giving our allegiance to the best moral ideal we see
in every situation. Natural evils, ranging from crop failure
to cancer, may be the occasion for realizing the intrinsic
value of rood will; barring a theory of providential punitive
intervention, this alone redeems natural evil from complete
irrationality. The element of contingency in nature makes it
more useful as a field in which good will may manifest itself
than if there were always perfect adaptation to natural envi-
ronment and personal purpose. The evolutionary hypothesis of C.
Lloyd Morgan suggests a manner in which G-od may maize the extra-
13
mental available to serve the mental. Perfect adjustment
of environment to purpose would tend to make the latter
realizable without struggle. This would result in automatons
rather than free agents, and would defeat any hooe of God's
14
for a society of persons capable of responding with good will.
If God has this hope, he has provided the material con-
ditions for personal functioning to cooperate with him in
realizing it. According to the proposed principle, he is
13. . " See above, pages 74f
.
14. Gf Flewelling, CP, 209; Brightman, PI, 90, 95-98;
Sorley, .IVIG, 285-289; 330; Pringle-Pattison, IG, 400ff.
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immanent in the purposive self to whom he gives ontological
significance, and in the material conditions by means of
which it realizes its selfhood.
This point of view on the nature of material things dis-
credits three competing explanations of the extra-mental
universe. In the first place, the natural world cannot absorb
mind, and be an evolving machine with conscious refinements , as
15
evolutionary naturalism maintains. Rather, the extra-mental
quality of the world, grounded in divine purpose, serves the
realization of values. Hence, ultimately nature exists in
relation to mind. Further, only in a world ground that is
personal can the permanent laws of nature proclaimed by in-
organic science be reconciled with the evolutionary changes
proclaimed by organic sciences. In the second place, an
ultimate dualism of mental and extra-mental is rejected by
the proposed principle. Divine immanence may conceivably
unify mind and matter in a manner analagous to the interaction
of mind and body within the mental life of the individual. But
however accomplished, the proposed principle maintains that
matter is ultimately sustained by, and under the control of,
divine Mind. Finally, the acknowledgment of contingency in
nature denies that extra-mental existence is a direct instru-
ment of divine Frovidence. Selves grow at a risk; they are not
made-to-order by providential acts of intervention in the
15. See above, page 75f.

137
extra-mental order,
v. Criteria of a Metaphysical Category. To qualify as
a metaphysical category, a philosophical principle must be
logically necessary for the position it supports, and its
16
validity must be asserted for the universe as a whole. To
meet these standards, it must be shown that the principle can-
not be included v/ithin any other principle. It is ultimate,
and so logically necessary for its position. A survey of the
positions opposed by the proposed principle illustrate its
categorical nature.
In general, it may be said that there are two basic meta-
17
physical points of view. Either ultimate reality is extra-
mental, or everything exists only in relation to mind. The
proposed principle accepts the second alternative, as the
rejection of the following positions indicates: neo-realism,
instrumental ism, behaviorism, evolutionary naturalism, theo-
logical humanism. Rather, ultimate reality is a society of
persons, of whom God is one.
This places the proposed principle on the side of a
pluralistic view of the universe, over against the alternative
of absolute idealism and pantheism. But, C-od is immanent in
the other members of the society, to whom he gives ontological
significance, and in the material medium in, and by means of
16. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 93-98.
17. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 230f,
-„
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which, they realize their selfhood. This position refutes
ultimate pluralism, and grounds mind and extra-mind in a
personal monism. Thus viewed, the universe is friendly to
-ood value and truth. But, value and truth are a natter of
volitional selection.
There are several corollaries of this position. From it
follow epistemological dualism and a metaphysical distinction
between right and wrong; volitional causality limited in man
by social and natural process, and in God by his purpose in
creating and sustaining social and natural process; and
morally conditioned immortality.
Prom the above outline of the relation of the proposed
principle to alternative theories of ultimate reality, it
appears that the principle cannot be included within any other
principle. It is valid for the universe as a whole. It is
ultimate, and logically necessary to the acceptance of the
position it represents. To deny self-directional activity opens
the way for systems of necessitarianism, and impersonalism. To
deny that self-directional activity is the function of persons
in society leads to solipsism. To deny the ontological signif-
icance of the self leaves the way open for neo-realism, instru-
mentalism, absolute idealism, and substantialism. To deny the
personal world ground of social and natural process makes
ultimate pluralism or naturalism a possible alternative.
These considerations justify the assertion that the
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proposed principle is categorical in its nature. In terns
of it, psychological data and theory may be made metaphysically
meaningful with respect to the universe as a whole.
4. THE PRINCIPLE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
DATA AND THEORY
The following principle has been proposed for inter-
preting psychological data and theory: Personality process,
and the social and natural process on which it depends, are
grounded in personal deity who promotes and conserves values.
The final problem of philosophy of psychology is to make
psychological data and theory meaningful in terms of this
principle
.
i. Interpretation of Psychological Data. Psychological
IS
data has been organized into theory by four principles. In
the following paragraphs, the data under each classification
will be related to the proposed philosophical principle.
(1) The data of physiological psychology are instances
19
of psycho-physical correlation. Such data are interpreted
by the philosophical principle as part of the natural process
in which God is immanent, and which serves as a condition of
self-directional activity.
(2) Data arising from the use of bodily mental reactive
equipment are classified under the principle of instrumental
18. See Chapter II above
19. See above, pages 27-33.
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behavior. Such data represent the functioning of the
20
organism as a means to some personally relevant end. They
are part of the natural process that is instrumental in serving
the purposes of personality process.
(3) The principle of value response classifies data per-
taining to the individually initiated value process in its
21
social context. Values are objective, but only to the extent
22
of their realization by valuers. Since it is maintained that
God promotes and conserves good values, the objective validity
of values is metaphysically grounded. Evil values can persist
only so long as the persons who value them are ontologically
significant.
(4) The ego principle classifies facts related to personal
identity as attested to by the experience of self-consciousness.
Included are the data of relevant past experience, desire for
self-enhancement, and the feeling of reality. According to
the proposed principle, each personality process is real in
itself, for it receives ontological significance from God. As
a producer of good values, man shares God's purpose, and may be
immortal. As a producer of evil values, man refuses to cooperate
with God, and may thus forfeit his ontological significance.
ii. Interpretation of Psychological Theory. As pointed
20. See above, pages 33-40
21. See above, pages 40-51.
22. See above, pages 98-100.
23. See above, pages 51-60.
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out above, osychological theory may be phenomenal or con-
24
ceptual. phenomenal theory is a statement of a relation-
ship among data. The stimulus-response theory, for example,
states that under certain conditions certain stimuli will
elicit a certain response from an organism. Conceptual
theory is an explanation of a relationship among data. For
example, the conception that human behavior functions within
a closed cause-effect nexus is a conceptual theory. It explains
why under certain conditions the stimulus-response relationship
exists. With respect to phenomenal theories, these are inter-
preted by philosophy of psychology according to the data they
relate. Conceptual theories are judged according to their
consistency with the interpretative principle of philosophy
of psychology.
The philosophy of psychology herein presented regards
the personality process as being in a measure self-determined,
and therefore r««o%rc* the category of purpose as an explanatory
D 25
concept, rather than any mechanical category. The proposed
philosophy of psychology presents a scientific category, which,
with the three principles from which it was derived, provides a
26
framework for the systematization of psychology. This frame-
24. See above, page 2.
25. For a discussion of the present status of psychologi-
cal theory with respect to explanatory categories, see above,
pages 6-11.
26. Cf. McGeoch, Art. (1933), llf. See above, page 17.
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work relates the empirical evidence of psychology to philo-
27
sophical points of view. The acceptance of this framework
involves the rejection of operationism. Operationism rests
28
upon presuppositions of extreme nominalism and positivism,
whereas the task of philosophy of psychology as herein pro-
posed is, by definition, to make psychological data and
29
theory philosophically relevant.
27. See Chapter III.
28. See above, pages 12-15.
29. See above, page If.
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ABSTRACT
1. FORMAL DEFINITION
A philosophy of psychology may suggest an ultimate,
empirically derived principle to serve as an hypothesis for
the interpretation of psychological data and theory.
The formal limits and extent of a philosophy of
psychology may be defined "by comparison with two similar
disciplines, namely, philosophical psychology and scientific
psychology. Philosophical psychology may make psychological
data and theory amenable to an a priori point of view, whereas
"ohilosophy of psychology is empirically conditioned. Here
it has an investigative spirit in common with scientific
psychology. It differs from scientific psychology by including
the consideration of values as such.
Scientific psychology has philosophical implications.
Thus, mechanistic categories of current psychology favor
materialism. Categories presupposing purpose permit idealistic
positions. Operationism suggests positivism.
It is the task of philosophy of psychology to make
such implicit philosophical issues explicit, and to construct
an interpretative principle upon an empirical basis.
2. EMPIRICAL BASIS
Psychological data may be organized into theory under
four principles:
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(1) The principle of psycho-physical correlation.
From numerous instances of the effects of neural and glandu-
lar functioning, and of disease and drugs, upon mental life
it is inferred that mental and physiological processes are
correlated.
(2) The principle of instrumental behavior. Motor
response, perception, imagination, thinking, appreciation,
and self-consciousness are used "by the individual as a means
to s ome end
.
(3) The principle of value response. The world is of
value to us when, in our commerce with it, needs are met and
desires satsified. The social group provides an objective
ground for value experience. Purposeful planning for value
experience is ideal motivation.
(4) The ego principle. The individual is a psychologi-
cal unit. Within the world he accepts as real he refers his
past experience to his present, self-enhancing purposes. This
reference presupposes the personal identity to which the
experience of self-consciousness attests.
The four principles are complementary. The facts to
which the principles, taken together, apply, constitute the
subject matter of psychology. For example, mental reactive
equipment used in instrumental behavior is psychologically
significant because it functions for the ego in achieving
ego-enhancing values in a social context. The mental life of
animals and idiots is excluded, and is subject matter for
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comparative psychology, rather than psychology proper.
Within this scope, no limits are placed upon psycho-
logical investigation by these principles. For example,
further investigation in physiological psychology will
strengthen the evidence for psycho-physical correlation.
Psychological theory and data, as sytematized "by the
four complementary principles, constitute the empirical
basis of philosophy of psychology.
3. PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS
Three philosophical problems arise from these empiri-
cally based principles:
(l) The mind-body problem. How the facts of psycho-
physical correlation, and of the instrumentality of mental
reactive equipment, are related to ultimate reality consti-
tutes the mind-body problem. Philosophical positions that in
some sense assert the inefficacy of mind (T.H. Huxley, J.B.
Watson), or the inefficacy of body (Bosanquet, Paulsen), are
empirically invalid. The positions of Montague, C.L. Morgan,
and Sellars (mind and body are, in some sense, material), of
J.B. Pratt (mind and body are qualitatively different; their
interaction is an ultimate fact), and of Brightman (dualistic
only in the sense of not identifying mind and body, and
explaining interaction by divine immanence) take into account
the reciprocal influence of mind and body. The following
principle is proposed to relate the empirical evidence and
these empirically valid positions:
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Bodily processes influence and condition, and are
instrumental to, self-determined mental processes.
(2) The problem of value. The question of the meta-
physical status of value is the problem of value. Value
experience is individually initiated and socially conditioned.
Empirically invalid theories of value include those that:
deny personally initiated achievement of value (A. P. Y/eiss);
do not use an empirical "basis (Spaulding); or underestimate
personal initiation, and exaggerate the social relevance, of
value (Ames). On the other hand, the theories of Perry (the
universe is indifferent to values), Wieman (the objectivity of
value is impersonal), and Sorley (the objectivity of values
is grounded in God) properly take into account the individual
initiation and social relevance of values. The following
principle is proposed to relate these empirically valid
interpretations of value and the psychological facts of value
experience
:
The value process is a function of personal purpose,
and exists objectively.
"Objectively" means: Value is judged by its relation
to a norm of value. Value exists within social process, and
is as real as the valuer. It has causal efficacy.
(3) The problem of personal identity. The fact of
consciously recognized personal continuity, and the sense of
reality, give rise to the experience of personal identity.
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The question of the metaphysical significance of this experi-
ence is the problem of personal identity. Philosophical
positions that grant ontological significance to the self, and
hold to epistemological dualism, are consistent v/ith the empiri-
cal evidence. In this respect strict neo-realism (Perry, E.B.
Holt), instrumentalism (Dewey), and Bradley's absolute idealism
are not empirically valid. Further, personal identity, (vs.
Stern and the neo-scholastics) , as an empirical fact seems to
owe nothing to any ulterior substance. No alternative to
accepting the phenomenal self as the real self is strictly con-
sistent with the empirical facts. Personal idealism, as
presented by Knudson and Brightman, accepts the persistence of
personal identity through change as its metaphysical starting
place. To that extent, its system appears empirically valid.
The following principle is proposed to relate this empirically
valid position and the psychological evidence:
Personal identity, in relating changing events to personal
continuity, requires an objective reference.
The above discussion has made explicit certain philosophi-
cal issues involved in psychology, and it has made psychological
data philosophically relevant.
4. AN ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE
Construction of an empirically derived principle for
interpreting psychological data and theory involves the
following steps:
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(1) The four constituent elements into which the
three principles discussed in Part Three may "be analyzed are:
"body; self-determination; objective reference; and personal
identity. Without all of these, personality process is
impossible. Therefore, the following scientific category,
embodying these four elements, is proposed:
Self-directional activity, utilizing
the bodily instrument to serve personal
needs, desires and purposes, makes an
objective difference and constantly
reaffirms personal identity.
(2) Accepting divine immanence, the objectivity of value
as grounded in God, and the ontological significance of persons,
positions empirically validated in Part Three, the following
principle is proposed to interpret the scientific category:
Self-directional activity, and the social
and natural process on which it depends,
are grounded in personal deity, who
participates in social and natural process
by promoting and conserving values.
Thus, God makes possible self-directional activity. He works
out his will in social and natural process. Mortally, man
is ontologically significant.. He may be immortally significant,
through cooperation with God.
(3) Either ultimate reality is extra-mental, or
everything exists only in relation to mind. In positing the
second alternative, the proposed principle excludes neo-realism,
instrumentalism, metaphysical behaviorism, evolutionary
naturalism, and empirical theism. Ultimate reality is a society
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of persons of whom God is one.
This favors pluralism as against absolute idealism and
pantheism. But the immanence of God in social and natural
process grounds the pluralism in the monism of a personal God.
Thus viewed, the universe is friendly to value.
Step one indicates the empirical derivation of the
proposed principle. Step two states the philosophical positions
involved in its construction. Step three applies the principle
to the universe as a whole, excluding all other ultimate princi-
ples. The final problem of philosophy of psychology is to
relate the principle to psychological data and theory.
Data classified under the principles of psycho-physical
correlation and instrumental behavior are interpreted in terms
of divine immanence. Value data are given metaphysical mean-
ing by the relation they bear to the will and purpose of God.
Data associated with personal identity are meaningful as they
contribute to the ontological reality of the self.
With respect to current psychological theory, the proposed
principle implies the category of purpose, and systematization
by principles that make psychological data and theory philo-
sophically relevant.
5. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
This philosophy of psychology suggests an ultimate,
empirically derived, principle for interpreting psychological
data and theory. The empirical derivation is as follows:
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First, psychological data are organized under four princi-
ples which formulate into theory: (l) the facts of psycho-
physical correlation; (2) of instrumental "behavior; (3) of
value experience, and (4) of personal identity.
Second, these four principles, taken together, involve
three philosophical issues, namely: (1) the mind-body problem;
(2) the problem of value; and (3) the problem of personal
identity. In each case there is proposed a principle that
relates the empirical evidence relevant to the problem, and
certain philosophical positions that conform to the evidence.
Third, these three principles are formulated as a
scientific category.
Fourth, certain of the empirically valid positions,
namely, divine immanence, objectivity of values as grounded in
God, and the ontological significance of persons, are involved
in a principle that interprets the scientific category.
This interpretative principle posits ultimate reality as
a society of persons including and grounded in God. Thus,
extra-mental theories of reality, absolute systems, and an
ultimately plural universe are excluded. The principle
interprets psychological data in terms of values, and finds
the category of purpose, and metaphysical postulates, essential
for a coherent psychological theory.
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